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I SWEAR! FROM SHOPTALK TO SOCIAL 
MEDIA: THE TOP TEN NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD PROFANITY CASES 
CHRISTINE NEYLON O’BRIEN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Two waitresses at Hooters got into a swearing match with 
another waitress who had won a mandatory bikini competition 
that was rumored to have been rigged in favor of the winner.1  
The two losing waitresses were terminated for yelling obscenities 
at their winning coworker in front of customers.2  An off-duty 
barista at a New York Starbucks repeatedly used profanity in a 
heated conversation with a manager in the presence of 
customers, and was fired for his conduct.3 
Employees at a Manhattan catering service complained to 
the director of banquet services about the hostile, degrading, and 
disrespectful treatment they received from managers.4  The 
employees filed a representation petition at the National Labor 
?
† Professor of Business Law, Carroll School of Management, Boston College; 
B.A., Boston College; J.D., Boston College Law School. The author wishes to thank 
Andrew Miller, M.B.A./J.D. candidate Boston College 2015, for his research 
assistance on this Article. 
1 Hoot Winc, LLC (Hooters of Ontario I), No. 31-CA-104872, slip op. at 13, 2014 
WL 2086220 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-
CA-104872, aff’d, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098, at *2 (Sept. 1, 2015) 
(upholding ALJ on illegality of mandatory arbitration agreement that required 
employees to waive all class and collective action in all forums, whether arbitral or 
judicial). As noted in the Board’s 2015 Hooters opinion, “the parties executed an 
informal Board settlement agreement and a non-Board settlement agreement 
resolving all alleged violations other than those pertaining to the maintenance of the 
arbitration agreement.” Hoot Winc, LLC (Hooters of Ontario II), 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 
2015 WL 5143098, at *1 n.1 (Sept. 1, 2015). 
2 Hooters of Ontario I, slip op. at 15. 
3 Starbucks Corp. (Starbucks IV), 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 2736112, at 
*2 (June 16, 2014). 
4 Pier Sixty, LLC (Pier Sixty II), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *1 
(Mar. 31, 2015). 
FINAL_O’BRIEN 8/25/2016  12:17 PM 
54 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:53   
Relations Board5 (“NLRB”) and an election resulted in 
certification of the union’s majority status.6  However, two days 
before the election, three employees who were serving drinks 
from trays were repeatedly told by an assistant director to spread 
out and stop talking.7  One server took a break and posted 
profane remarks about the assistant director on his personal 
Facebook page, and included a plea to vote for the union.8  The 
server was terminated for his vulgar Facebook comments.9 
In the midst of a labor dispute at a tire company, the 
employer locked out the bargaining unit employees.10  The union 
members staffed a peaceful picket line.11  On an evening when 
the union sponsored a hog roast at the hall adjacent to the plant 
entrance and the picket line, some of the locked-out employees 
engaged in profanity, name-calling, and vulgar gestures such as 
pointing their middle fingers upwards at the replacement 
workers who were crossing the picket line in vehicles.12  The 
locked-out workers demanded that the replacements “go home” 
and not steal their jobs.13  A locked-out employee was terminated 
for, among other things, yelling out:  “Hey, did you bring enough 
KFC for everyone?” And later, “Hey, anybody smell that?  I smell 
fried chicken and watermelon.”14  Many of the replacement 
workers were of African-American descent, and the company had 
a policy prohibiting racial harassment.15 
These employees were all terminated for their use of 
profanity aimed at coworkers, managers, and strikebreakers.  
Should they get their jobs back?  The examples above reference 
facts in recent cases that were brought to the NLRB by 
?
5 The National Labor Relations Board or NLRB is also referred to as the Board 
in this Article. 
6 Pier Sixty, LLC (Pier Sixty I), No. 2-CA-068612, slip op. at 4, 2013 WL 
1702462 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/02-CA-
068612, aff’d, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *1 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
7 Pier Sixty II, 2015 WL 1457688, at *1. 
8 Id. at *2. 
9 Id. 
10 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 08-CA-087155, slip op. at 2–3, 2015 WL 
3544120 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 5, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA-
087155. 
11 Id. at 3. 
12 Id. at 4–5. 
13 Id. at 4. 
14 Id. at 4–6. 
15 Id. at 3, 6. 
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employees or their unions against Hooters,16 Starbucks,17 Pier 
Sixty,18 and Cooper Tire and Rubber Company.19  In all of these 
cases, as well as in others, the NLRB or an Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) ordered reinstatement of the employees because 
the conduct for which the employees were terminated was 
protected concerted activity under § 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”).20 
Why is profanity protected under § 7 of the NLRA?  Section 7 
grants private sector employees who are protected by the Act, 
whether or not they are members of a union, the right to engage 
in protected concerted activity, which includes communication 
regarding: organization, or refraining from such; wages, hours, 
and working conditions; and other concerted activities for mutual 
aid or protection, all of which provide employees with a bare 
bones workplace bill of rights.21  Employees must be acting in 
concert and within these defined subject areas for their 
communication to fall within the umbrella of § 7’s protection.22  
The concept of acting in concert generally involves two or more 
employees acting together, but the concept also includes one 
employee involving another coworker before acting, or one 
employee acting on the behalf of others, for the benefit of more 
than just the acting employee.23  If employees engage in conduct 
that is not concerted, or that exceeds the boundaries of protected 
activity because it is reckless, malicious, or violent, then they are 
?
16 Hooters of Ontario I, No. 31-CA-104872, 2014 WL 2086220 (N.L.R.B. Div. of 
Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872, aff’d, 363 N.L.R.B. 
No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098 (Sept. 1, 2015). 
17 Starbucks IV, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 2736112 (June 16, 2014). 
18 Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
19 Cooper Tire, No. 08-CA-087155, 2015 WL 3544120. 
20 Section 7 provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have 
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
21 See Christine Neylon O’Brien, Am I Blue or Seeing Red? The NLRB Sees 
Purple When Employer Communication Policies Unduly Restrict Section 7 Activities, 
66 LAB. L.J. 75, 75–76 (2015); see also Rights We Protect: Protected Concerted 
Activity, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/protected-concerted-activity 
(last visited May 18, 2016). 
22 O’Brien, supra note 21. 
23 Id. at 75. 
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not protected by § 7.24  The concept of protected concerted activity 
allows for some impulsivity and posturing regarding collective 
bargaining, grievances, picketing, and strike activity, as such 
behavior is expected in light of the confrontational nature of 
these activities.25  Profanity may be part of the impulsive 
dialogue between employers and employees as both sides seek to 
arrive at industrial peace in these contexts. 
There are many recent NLRB cases that involve profanity,26 
and this type of conduct—or misconduct, depending upon your 
point of view—is far from new.27  After all, swearing is hardly a 
modern invention.28  Nonetheless, engaging in profanity at work 
or with coworkers online is certainly controversial, especially 
when the profanity is directed at managers or when it harms the 
company’s reputation.29  It seems that in the early days of the 
NLRA, some allowance was made for rougher talk among men at 
work than that which was expected to take place in normal civil 
?
24 Id. See Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB 
Div. of Advice, to Gail R. Moran, Acting Reg’l Dir., Region 13, regarding JT’s Porch 
Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., No. 13-CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964 (July 7, 2011), available 
at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-046689 (finding that bartender who was 
terminated for engaging in profanity and making negative remarks on Facebook to 
his step-sister about the employer’s tipping policy and its customers was not 
engaged in concerted activity because he did not discuss the policy with fellow 
employees before or after he wrote the posts). 
25 See Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (1948) (noting debate without 
censorship inherent in collective bargaining process for employee to be perceived as 
equal to employer in context of trading and bargaining negotiations, and that 
employee discharge for engaging in frank exchange of views would discourage 
membership in the grievance committee). 
26 See The Hooters Precedent; The NLRB Says You Can Tell Your Boss to @$%#! 
and Still Keep Your Job, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/the-hooters-precedent-1411426971 (discussing an article authored by 
employment law lawyers that noted a trend in Hooters, Starbucks Corp., and other 
cases where the NLRB sides with employees who insulted their employers, thereby 
condoning profanity and insubordination). 
27 See Katy Steinmetz, Nine Things You Probably Didn’t Know About Swear 
Words, TIME (Apr. 10, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/04/10/nine-things-you-
probably-didnt-know-about-swear-words/ (noting swear words have been around 
since the time of our forebears’ forebears). 
28 See Melissa Mohr, The Modern History of Swearing: Where All the Dirtiest 
Words Come From, SALON (May 11, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/ 
2013/05/11/the_modern_history_of_swearing_where_all_the_dirtiest_words_come_fr
om/ (discussing swearing in the 18th and 19th centuries including the use of the 
word “bloody”). 
29 See Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. at 526–27, 533 (involving employee fired 
for implying president/treasurer of company was manipulating the books to evidence 
a loss, intimating that he was a “crook and a liar”). 
FINAL_O’BRIEN 8/25/2016  12:17 PM 
2016] FROM SHOPTALK TO SOCIAL MEDIA 57 
society.30  Thus, some swearing at managers was permitted if 
employees were engaged in what was defined as protected 
concerted activity under the NLRA.31  Men were practically 
expected to swear at work in the context of letting out their 
thoughts and complaints relating to their jobs.32  The NLRB 
seemed to accept that horrible bosses cause employees to swear!33  
In light of the underlying purpose of the NLRA—to redress the 
imbalance of power between employers and employees—
uncensored comments were often excused because of the 
posturing that takes place in the context of collective bargaining, 
or during the resolution of grievances.34  While the Board 
recognized that some of the use of profanity was mere shoptalk, 
it noted: 
A line exists beyond which an employee may not with impunity 
go, but that line must be drawn “between cases where 
employees engaged in concerted activities exceed the bounds of 
lawful conduct in ‘a moment of animal exuberance’ . . . or in a 
manner not activated by improper motives, and those flagrant 
cases in which the misconduct is so violent or of such serious 
character as to render the employee unfit for further service.”35 
Today, both male and female employees may swear,36 and 
they may do so in all sorts of contexts: in person, with statements 
?
30 See id. at 535. 
31 See Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 345, 347 (1982) (finding employee 
profanity protected as spontaneous outburst in grievance proceeding or collective 
bargaining, or if provoked by employer unfair labor practice). Cf. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1324–26 (1985) (upholding discharge of employee because 
profane cartoon depicting supervisor as razorback pig urinating on workers not 
protected as it was a vicious personal attack). 
32 See Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. at 527. 
33 This brings to mind the comedy act by The Jerky Boys, “Hurt at Work.” The 
Jerky Boys, Hurt at Work, WN.COM (July 21, 2011), http://wn.com/the_jerky_boys_-
_hurt_at_work. 
34 See Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. at 527 (noting context of protected 
concerted activities that results in posturing). 
35 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Ill. Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 815–16 (7th Cir. 1946) 
(quoting Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 
312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941))). 
36 Note that the Hooters case involved women swearing at a work-related event. 
Hooters of Ontario I, No. 31-CA-104872, slip op. at 13, 2014 WL 2086220 (N.L.R.B. 
Div. of Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872, aff’d, 363 
N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098 (Sept. 1, 2015). See also Copps Foods, 323 
N.L.R.B. 998, 999, 1001 (1997) (upholding termination of female baker who swore at 
supervisor, saying: “This is f—king bullshit. This is one asshole company to work 
for”). 
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or designs on apparel or buttons, on informational flyers in an 
employee breakroom, or via email and social media in the virtual 
world.  So, conversations that include profanity may take place 
on the shop floor, in a retail setting, in a parking lot, or on social 
media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.  
How should the NLRB rule with respect to the use of profanity in 
each of these contexts?  Does a retail setting call for completely 
curtailing employee profanity regardless of the subject matter?  
Should the relative status of those doing the swearing matter?  
Should the reach of the communication, in terms of size and 
composition of the audience, dictate the outcome?  Should the 
conduct and the values of the employer make a difference? 
Is it the profanity itself that is so problematic to the 
employer or is it the disrespect or disloyalty that is reflected in 
the profanity?  Employers and managers do not want to be 
insulted or lose control of employee behavior.37  Most employers 
seek to prevent profanity from harming the image of the 
company or its brand.  Sometimes the employer’s concern focuses 
on how the employee treats the boss, and how this impacts the 
management of other employees because of an apparent lack of 
control regarding outbursts.  Other times the employer’s concern 
focuses on the negative impact of such language on its customers 
in, for example, a retail setting.  At some point, one wonders just 
how much profanity the employer is required to tolerate simply 
because it occurs in the context of employees’ protected concerted 
activity.  Is shoptalk in the workplace on nonworking time more 
or less protected than online talk on social media that takes place 
on the employees’ own time?  In the era of social media, the 
employer’s concern with preserving the company’s reputation is 
clearly exacerbated because of the reach and immediacy of online 
communication, but in some respects, discussion on social media 
has less impact on an employer’s maintenance of production and 
discipline than workplace discussions that include profanity.  
How should the NLRB balance the interests of employers with 
employees’ exercise of § 7 rights when it includes profanity? 
?
37 The Board has long recognized the employer’s right to demonstrate special 
circumstances requiring it to implement rules necessary to maintain production or 
discipline even if these rules have some restrictive impact upon protected concerted 
activity. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945). 
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The Board has worked to adapt its standards for protected 
concerted activity from face-to-face communication to electronic 
communication, including social media.38  As will be discussed in 
Part III, the NLRB has recognized in recent cases that some of 
the factors weighed to determine if an employee’s outburst of 
profanity should lose protection vary depending upon the 
medium, the context, the provocation, the audience, and the 
actors.39 
This Article curates and analyzes ten recent cases where the 
NLRB decided whether or not § 7 protected employee swearing, 
with a view toward defining the implications of these decisions 
for employers and employees in terms of employer rules and 
discipline, and employee rights and limits thereon.40  The Article 
outlines the NLRB’s role and perspective in cases where 
employees are disciplined or discharged for engaging in profanity 
at work and/or on social media when the conduct in question is 
otherwise protected concerted activity.41  The Article summarizes 
the facts in each case while analyzing the legal framework that 
the NLRB uses to evaluate whether the conduct is protected, 
and, even if it is, whether the employee loses the protection of the 
NLRA because of the egregiousness of the employee’s conduct, as 
it weighs the totality of the employee’s conduct objectively.42  
Further, the Article discusses: (1) employer rules relating to 
profanity that run afoul of the NLRA because they unduly 
interfere with employee exercise of protected concerted activity, 
and (2) the Board’s ongoing directive to revise such rules as part 
of its remedy for these employer unfair labor practices.43  
Whether the employee conduct is face-to-face or on social media, 
the NLRB sets standards on what communication is protected 
?
38 See Michael Z. Green, The NLRB as an Überagency for the Evolving 
Workplace, 64 EMORY L.J. 1621, 1630 (2015) (noting importance of NLRB’s action in 
addressing new forms of digital-age communications); Christine Neylon O’Brien, The 
National Labor Relations Board: Perspectives on Social Media, 8 CHARLESTON L. 
REV. 411, 413–14 (2014) (discussing NLRB tests on employer social media policies 
and related rules); Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Top Ten NLRB Cases on Facebook 
Firings and Employer Social Media Policies, 92 OR. L. REV. 337, 375 (2013) (noting 
NLRB was applying same rules for protecting employees’ concerted activity to social 
media cases). 
39 See infra Part III.A, C. 
40 See infra Parts II–III. 
41 See infra Parts II–III. 
42 See infra Parts II–III. 
43 See infra Part VI. 
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and what is not, depending upon whether the subject matter falls 
within § 7 and whether the employee crosses the line into 
behavior that the Board finds does not deserve the protection of 
the Act.44  The survey includes NLRB cases involving employees 
swearing in a face-to-face context using union buttons, and other 
union materials, and on email and social media. 
I. THE TOP TEN NLRB PROFANITY CASES 
The following table summarizes information on the top ten 
recent NLRB profanity cases analyzed in this Article.  The 
categories include the case name and number, and the source of 
authority—whether a decision of the NLRB itself, or a decision of 
an ALJ, which has not yet been heard by the NLRB.  Next is the 
date of the latest decision in each case, followed by the outcome 
of the unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charges filed, what remedy 
was ordered, and the current status of appeal or compliance as 
noted on the NLRB case pages.45  In all ten cases, at least one 
employee was discharged.  Commonly, the NLRB orders the 
respondent-employer that has violated the NLRA to post a notice 
indicating that it will not commit the ULP again in the future.  
Thus, in the cases where ULPs were found, this is a routinely 
ordered remedy.46  The next column indicates whether there was 
a union present, whether a union was organizing, or if there was 
no union at all.  Finally, in the context of profanities in the 
workplace, the cases indicate if it involved face-to-face 
communication, union buttons or other union insignia, defacing 
union materials in an employee breakroom, or social media.  The 
cases are organized with the first five involving face-to-face 
conduct, the next four involving communication on social media, 
and the last involving materials on a breakroom bulletin board. 
?
44 See infra Part VI. 
45 See the case pages, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/board-
decisions, for the latest information on the status of open cases. 
46 In cases where employers have policies that violate the Act and apply beyond 
the instant geographic site, the employer is required to revise the policies and post a 
remedial notice across all of its facilities, including electronic notice where that 
medium is available and customarily used for communication to employees. J & R 
Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372, at *1 (Oct. 22, 2010) (noting 
remedial posting should include electronic notice where such notice is customary 
mode of communication). 
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Table of Top Ten NLRB Profanity Cases 
Top 
Ten Case Name Source of Authority Date Outcome, Remedies, Status 
Union 
Presence Context 
1 Hoot Winc, 
LLC 
31-CA-
104872 
NLRB 
ALJ 
 
 
NLRB 
5/19/14
 
 
 
9/1/15 
Reinstatement & Backpay
Revise Overly Broad Rules; Post 
Notice No More ULPs; 
Settlement Agreement Reached 
10/22/14; 
Board Upheld Illegality of 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreement 
9/1/15; 
Appeal Filed, 9th Cir., Case Nos. 15-
72839, 15-72931 
 
No Union 
 
Face-to-Face 
2 Plaza Auto 
Ctr., Inc. 
28-CA-
022256 
NLRB 5/28/14 Reinstatement & Backpay;
Post Notice No More ULPs; 
Compliance Closing Letter 11/21/14 
No Union 
 
Face-to-Face 
3 Starbucks 
Corp. 
02-CA-
037548 
NLRB 6/16/14 Reinstatement & Backpay;
Post Notice No More ULPs; 
Compliance Closing Letter 6/25/15 
Union Was 
Organizing 
 
Face-to-Face 
4 Pac. Bell Tel. 
Co. 
20-CA-
080400 
NLRB 6/2/15 Reinstatement & Backpay;
Revise Overly Broad Rule re: Union 
Insignia & Buttons; Post Notice No 
More ULPs; 
Appeal Filed, D.C. Cir., Case No. 15-
73034 
Union 
 
Face-to-Face, 
Union Buttons 
& Shirts 
5 Cooper Tire 
& Rubber 
Co. 
08-CA-
087155 
 
NLRB 
ALJ 
6/5/15 Reinstatement & Backpay;
Post Notice No More ULPs; 
Exceptions to ALJ Decision Filed 
7/20/15; 
Appeal Pending at NLRB 
Union 
 
Face-to-Face, 
Picket Line, 
Racial 
Harassment 
Policy 
6 Triple Play 
34-CA-
012915 
NLRB 8/22/14
 
10/21/15 
 
Reinstatement & Backpay;
Revise Overly Broad 
Internet/Blogging Policy; 
Post Notice No More ULPs; 
Second Circuit Aff’d 10/21/15 
2015 WL 6161477 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 
2015) (Summary Order) 
No Union 
 
Facebook 
7 Bettie Page 
Clothing 
20-CA-
035511 
NLRB 10/31/14 Reinstatement & Backpay; Revise 
Rules re: Salary Disclosure, 
Confidentiality, etc.; 
Post Notice No More ULPs; 
Appeal Filed, D.C. Cir., Case No. 14-
1232; 
Oral Argument 1/21/16 
No Union 
 
Facebook, Some 
Face-to-Face 
8 Pier Sixty, 
LLC 
02-CA-
068612 & 
02-CA-
070797 
NLRB 3/31/15 Reinstatement & Backpay;
Post Notice No More ULPs; 
Appeal Filed, 2d Cir., Case Nos. 15-
1841, -1962; 
Oral Argument Scheduled for 4/5/16 
Union 
Organizing 
Election 
Pending 
 
Facebook 
9 Tinley Park 
Hotel & 
Convention 
Ctr., LLC 
13-CA-
141609 
NLRB 
ALJ 
6/16/15 Reinstatement & Backpay;
Revise Overly Broad Rules re 
Disloyalty, Confidentiality, 
Disrespectful/Disruptive Conduct; 
Post Notice No More ULPs; 
Transferred to NLRB 6/16/15; 
Exceptions to ALJ Decision 7/14/15; 
Appeal Pending at NLRB 
No Union 
 
 
Facebook 
10 Fresenius 
USA Mfg., 
Inc. 
02-CA-
039518 
NLRB 6/24/15 Dishonesty not Protected;
Discharge Upheld but 
Cease and Desist Prohibiting 
Employees from Discussing 
Investigations; Post Notice No More 
ULPs; Compliance Certification of 
Posting 7/30/15; 
Compliance Closing Letter 11/9/15 
Union 
Decertific-
ation 
Election 
Pending 
Employee 
Defaced Sign in 
Breakroom; 
Dishonesty in 
Investigation of 
Sexual 
Harassment 
Claims 
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II. FACE-TO-FACE CASES 
The following five cases involve employees who engaged in 
vulgar, profane interactions with coworkers or managers in a 
face-to-face context.  These employees were discharged because of 
their offensive conduct that took place in the midst of concerted 
activity.  The analysis includes the factual situation, as well as 
how the NLRB evaluated whether the employees should lose the 
protection of the NLRA in each case, despite the otherwise 
protected nature of their concerted conduct that related to terms 
and conditions of employment, or involved mutual aid or 
protection under § 7 of the Act. 
A. Hooters of Ontario 
The Hooters location in Ontario, California held an annual 
bikini contest.47  This was an event that drew large numbers of 
customers and provided publicity for the restaurants and the 
participants.48  An NLRB ALJ found that the company violated 
§ 8(a)(1) of the Act when it terminated employee Hanson for 
engaging in protected concerted activity because she had 
complained about working conditions, wages, and her belief that 
the contest was rigged.49  The employee complained because both 
the winner’s best friend and boyfriend judged the contest that the 
winner arranged, competed in, and then won.50  The Vice 
President for Human Resources asserted that Hanson was 
discharged because she cursed at the winner, and when Hanson 
denied the swearing, the V.P. added that the termination was for 
negative Twitter posts.51  However, on cross-examination, the 
V.P. stated that she did not rely on Hanson’s tweets as a basis for 
termination.52  The ALJ found that Ms. Hanson did not in fact  
 
 
?
47 Hooters of Ontario I, No. 31-CA-104872, slip op. at 8, 2014 WL 2086220 
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872, 
aff’d, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098 (Sept. 1, 2015). 
48 Id. at 10. 
49 Id. at 28, 40. 
50 Id. at 12–13. 
51 Id. at 27. 
52 Id. at 27 n.7. Another discharged coworker who cursed at the winner in front 
of customers and coworkers filed a charge with the Board, but her charge was 
dismissed and she did not appeal. Id. at 15–16. 
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swear at the winner as the employer alleged, and that Hanson’s 
conduct was indeed protected so that she was entitled to 
reinstatement and backpay.53 
The ALJ in Hooters addressed a number of Hooters’ rules 
that were problematic under the NLRA.54  First, the company’s 
rule prohibiting discussing tips explicitly restricted § 7 protected 
activity—namely, discussing wages—and was unlawfully 
overbroad in that it prohibited discussing the same with guests 
who were nonemployees.55  Next, the company’s rule against 
insubordination was unlawful because it prohibited all 
disrespectful conduct towards others, including managers, fellow 
employees, and guests, and imposed an inherently subjective 
standard.56  Such a rule would have a chilling effect upon the 
exercise of § 7 rights and had no limitations placed upon its 
broad terms.57  Further, the disrespect to guests prohibition was 
“unlawfully overbroad and unqualified,” as was the ban on 
profanity or negative comments or actions, and “no examples or 
clarifications [were] provided.”58  In addition, the nondisclosure 
rule regarding sensitive company materials was unlawfully 
overbroad because employees could reasonably conclude that it 
prohibited discussing wages and other employment terms and 
conditions with nonemployees, including union representatives.59 
Hooters’ rule regarding conduct that the company reasonably 
believes a threat to its smooth operation, goodwill or profitability 
was overbroad because employees would reasonably construe it 
to inhibit protected activity under § 7.60  The employer’s rule 
regarding off-duty conduct was unlawfully overbroad for similar 
reasons in that it could reasonably be construed to prohibit 
discussion of wages and working conditions with coworkers or 
others.61  The company’s rule against discussing company 
business or legal affairs outside of the company failed to comply 
with the NLRA as well, because it would interfere with employee 
?
53 Id. at 27–28, 42, 44. 
54 Id. at 34–39. 
55 Id. at 36. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 37. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 38. 
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rights to discuss terms and conditions of employment.62  The 
company’s rule against posting information about the company 
on social networking sites was also illegal because of its impact 
on protected § 7 activity, as was Hooters’ ban on disrespecting 
the company, employees, customers, partners, and competitors, 
posting offensive language or pictures that can be viewed by 
coworkers or clients, and posting any information under any 
circumstances about a coworker or customer.63  The ALJ was 
careful to note that no mention was made of permitting conduct 
protected by § 7 as a limitation on these rules.64  Last, the 
company’s rules regarding confidential information and 
nondisclosure were broadly written and clearly prohibited 
discussion of matters protected by § 7, and thus were unlawful.65  
The ALJ required Hooters to revise many of its rules that unduly 
restricted § 7 rights, including one that required employees to 
waive their right to class or collective action in all forums, 
judicial or arbitral.66 
B. Plaza Auto Center 
In Plaza Auto Center, Inc.,67 Nick Aguirre, a former car 
salesman, complained about the lack of bathroom facilities at a 
tent sale, and questioned the employer’s compensation policy for 
?
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 38–39. 
65 Id. at 40. 
66 Id. at 41–42. This mandatory individual arbitration rule violated the Board’s 
holding in D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012), 
enforced in part, rev’d in part sub nom. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th 
Cir. 2013), which, because he was bound by Board precedent, the ALJ found 
controlling. Hooters of Ontario I, slip op. at 30–31. After the filing of exceptions by 
Hooters, a three-member panel of the NLRB agreed with the ALJ that Hooters’ 
mandatory arbitration agreement “would reasonably be read by employees to 
prohibit the filing of [ULP] charges with the Board” and thus the policy violated the 
Act. See Hooters of Ontario II, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098, at *1–2 (Sept. 
1, 2015) (first citing Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, 
at *25 n.98 (Oct. 28, 2014); then citing D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012 WL 36274, at *2); see 
also Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, The NLRB v. The Courts: 
Showdown over the Right to Collective Action in Workplace Disputes, 52 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 75, 76–77 (2015) (analyzing the Board’s rule that § 7 ensures an employee’s 
right to proceed collectively and mandatory arbitration agreements that cut off all 
collective action violate the NLRA). 
67 Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. (Plaza Auto III), 360 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 2014 WL 
2213747 (May 28, 2014). 
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sales.68  He challenged commission calculations, asserting that 
the company failed to follow its policies regarding flat list 
commissions in a sale he made from the “flat list,” with the result 
that he was underpaid for that sale.69  In addition, Aguirre 
complained about the employer deducting a portion of the cost of 
repair for a damaged vehicle equally from all salesmen in the 
event that no one admitted to causing the damage.70  Further, 
Aguirre contacted the state wage and hour agency and advised 
other employees that they were entitled to the minimum wage as 
a draw against commissions.71  Thereafter, one of the sales 
managers called a meeting attended by the owner, Tony Plaza, as 
well as another  manager and Aguirre.72  At the meeting, Plaza 
told Aguirre that he was talking negatively and asking too many 
questions, that he should not be complaining about pay, and that 
if he did not trust them, he did not need to work there.73  Aguirre 
got upset and called Plaza a “fucking crook,” and an “asshole,” 
and he further informed the owner that he was “stupid, nobody 
liked him, and everyone talked about him behind his back.”74  
Aguirre then stood up, pushed his chair aside, and warned Mr. 
Plaza that if he fired him, he would regret it; whereupon Plaza 
did fire him.75 
Clearly, Aguirre’s conduct involved NLRA protected activity 
in that he acted in concert regarding his own as well as others’ 
wages and working conditions.76  As the Board noted, Aguirre 
“spoke with his fellow employees and managers about . . . breaks, 
restroom facilities, and compensation.”77  In Plaza Auto,78 the 
NLRB reconsidered its earlier decision upon remand from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which 
directed the Board to reweigh the NLRB’s four-factor Atlantic 
?
68 Id. at *1. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at *2. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. at *20 (Member Johnson, dissenting) (stating, “[i]t is undisputed that 
Aguirre was engaged in protected concerted activity when voicing his complaints”). 
77 Id. at *1 (majority opinion). 
78 Id. 
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Steel test.79  While the appellate court agreed with the Board that 
three of the four factors weighed in favor of protecting the 
employee’s conduct, the court required the Board to reassess the 
fourth “nature of the outburst” factor to see if this should result 
in Aguirre’s conduct losing the Act’s protection.80  The Ninth 
Circuit noted that the ALJ had found that despite the protected 
activity involved, the salesman’s obscene remarks and personal 
attacks on the owner resulted in a loss of the protection of the 
Act.81  In contrast to the ALJ’s finding, the Board initially found 
that the conduct was not so severe as to result in the loss of the 
Act’s protection.82  Upon remand to the NLRB from the appellate 
court, the Board once again found that the employer violated the 
Act when it discharged the salesman and that the employee did 
not lose the protection of the Act because of his outburst.83 
Following the appellate court’s direction to reweigh the 
“nature of the outburst” factor, the Board held that the 
employee’s outburst “solely involved obscene and denigrating 
remarks that constituted insubordination” and did not involve 
“menacing, physically aggressive, or belligerent conduct.”84  In 
addition, the Board found that the other three factors 
“compellingly favor[ed] Aguirre’s retaining protection.”85  The 
Board looked to the precedent of Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. 
NLRB,86 a case involving employee language to a supervisor that 
warned of unfavorable outcomes for the employer if it disciplined 
or discharged employees for their conduct.87  As noted in Plaza 
Auto, the Kiewit employees’ statements were deemed not 
physically threatening, and the D.C. Circuit enforced the Board’s 
Kiewit decision.88  Moreover, the Board, invoking Kiewit, 
?
79 See Green, supra note 38, at 1639 (discussing the NLRB’s 2014 Plaza Auto 
decision and its interpretation of Atlantic Steel). The four factors from Atlantic Steel 
Co. are: “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; 
(3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any 
way, provoked by an employer’s [ULP].” 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
80 Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB (Plaza Auto II), 664 F.3d 286, 296 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
81 Id. at 291. 
82 Id.; see Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. (Plaza Auto I), 355 N.L.R.B. 493 (2010). 
83 Plaza Auto III, 2014 WL 2213747, at *1. 
84 Id. at *4. 
85 Id. 
86 Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
87 Id. at 24, 29 n.2. 
88 See Plaza Auto III, 2014 WL 2213747, at *5–6. 
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emphasized in Plaza Auto that employee statements must be 
weighed objectively rather than subjectively.89  Thus, when 
viewed objectively in the Board’s view, the fact that Aguirre rose 
from his chair and pushed it aside was insufficient to find that 
his conduct was menacing, physically aggressive, or belligerent.90  
In addition, Plaza testified that he fired Aguirre for his verbal 
abuse and would not have fired him otherwise.91 
Even though the Board agreed with the Ninth Circuit that 
the “nature of the outburst” factor from Atlantic Steel weighed 
against protection of Aguirre’s conduct, finding his remarks 
repeatedly profane and insulting in a face-to-face encounter, the 
Board found that this did not require it to find that Aguirre lost 
the Act’s protection.92  Rather, the Board found that the other 
three factors weighed in favor of protection, and outweighed the 
one factor that worked against Aguirre.93  Thus, the subject 
matter surrounding the encounter weighed in favor of protected 
conduct because it involved concerted complaints regarding 
terms and conditions of employment, and also because it occurred 
in a private meeting, as opposed to on a public work floor where 
other workers could hear.94  Also, the employer provoked 
Aguirre’s outburst by telling him he could quit if he did not like 
the employer’s policies, and by implying that continuing to 
engage in § 7 protected activity was incompatible with remaining 
employed.95  Tony Plaza essentially refused to deal with Aguirre’s 
complaints and indicated hostility to his conduct, conduct that 
was protected by the Act.96  The timing of Aguirre’s outburst, 
which occurred immediately after Plaza’s refusal to deal with the 
substance of Aguirre’s complaints, and the implicit threat of 
discharge if Aguirre continued to complain, all provoked the 
outburst, which the Board concluded would not have occurred 
absent the provocation.97  The Board provided a reasoned 
?
89 Id. 
90 Id. at *5. 
91 Id. at *9. 
92 Id. at *10. 
93 Id. at *11. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at *12. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at *13. The Board also noted that Aguirre had not used such profanity 
before, that his disciplinary record was spotless, and that he had not previously 
engaged in violent or threatening behavior. Id. 
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explanation, keeping with applicable law in light of assessing 
Aguirre’s outburst for menace, aggressiveness, or belligerence by 
an objective standard.98  The Board rejected the ALJ’s 
belligerence finding, and ordered Aguirre’s reinstatement with 
backpay and other benefits intact, expungement of any negative 
information in his files regarding the discharge, and posting of 
appropriate notices.99 
Board Member Johnson dissented from the majority’s 
decision, finding that Aguirre’s discharge was clearly justified 
because his conduct lost the Act’s protection.100  Johnson stated 
that protected concerted activity should not shield employees 
who “curse, denigrate, and defy their managers” just because the 
audience is small, there is provocation, and there are no “overt 
physical threats.”101  Johnson focused on the Ninth Circuit’s 
remand instructions, particularly with respect to the “nature of 
the outburst” factor from Atlantic Steel.102  He viewed the 
majority opinion as not giving “full effect” to the ALJ’s “factual 
finding that Aguirre engaged in physically aggressive, menacing, 
or belligerent behavior.”103  Johnson rejected the majority’s 
reweighing of the other three factors that favored protection 
against the one that did not.104  He objected to the majority’s 
presumption that profanity is a reality of industrial life, finding 
that, in contrast to a “Scorsese film,”105 an expectation of civility 
at work is both reasonable and necessary.106  Johnson drew 
distinctions based upon the cultural context of the business, 
including the size of the enterprise and the values of the owners, 
as well as what was accepted behavior at the particular 
workplace.107  Johnson would not excuse a “profane and 
?
98 Id. at *15–16. 
99 Id. at *16. 
100 Id. at *19 (Member Johnson, dissenting). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at *20 (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979)). 
103 Id. at *21. 
104 Id. at *22. 
105 Id. at *23 & n.16 (referencing the film “The Wolf of Wall Street,” which was 
reported to set a record high with 560 uses of the “f-word” in a film). 
106 Id. at *23. 
107 Id. This last factor seems particularly important in that an employer can 
hardly complain about an employee using the same language that it uses, unless of 
course such language would undermine the employer’s ability to supervise and 
discipline. Still, one cannot help but think that what is good for the employee might 
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demeaning personal attack on Plaza” simply because it took place 
in a private room away from the main area or shop floor.108  He 
then noted that employers have a duty based upon other 
employment laws to monitor profanity that may “be viewed as 
harassing, bullying, creating a hostile work environment, or a 
warning sign of workplace violence.”109  Johnson warned that 
“[t]he Board is not an ‘überagency’ authorized to ignore those 
laws in its efforts to protect . . . § 7 rights.”110  Johnson viewed the 
Board’s protection of misconduct as working against “ ‘industrial 
peace’ and labor relations stability,” both goals of the NLRA.111  
Johnson would have preferred that Aguirre continue to pursue 
redress on the wage issue through government agencies rather 
than launching into “a profane, personally abusive rant.”112 
It is interesting that neither the majority nor the dissenting 
opinion in Plaza Auto noted that there were three members of 
management versus one employee, Aguirre, in the small room 
where the disciplinary meeting, Aguirre’s outburst, and his 
discharge took place.  Based upon numbers alone, management 
certainly had more physical power than one lone employee, and 
the facts indicate that when Aguirre stood up and pushed his 
chair away to get out of the room, two managers also stood up.113  
Historically, the Board has long recognized the importance of an 
employee being able to request a union representative to 
accompany the employee on an investigatory interview that 
reasonably could lead to discipline, but, in Plaza Auto, there was 
neither a union present nor such a request.114 
?
be good for the employer as well, especially under a statute such as the NLRA that 
was intended to equalize bargaining power between employers and employees. 
108 Id. at *24. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at *8 n.6 (majority opinion). 
114 The right to request a union representative in this context is often referred to 
as a “Weingarten right.” In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld 
the NLRB’s decision that, based upon § 7 of the NLRA, an employee has the right to 
request that a union representative be present at an investigatory interview that the 
employee reasonably fears might lead to discipline. 420 U.S. 251, 267–68 (1975); see 
also Christine Neylon O’Brien, The NLRB Waffling on Weingarten Rights, 37 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 111, 114 (2005) (detailing the NLRB’s changing position on Weingarten 
rights in the non-union context). 
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C. Starbucks 
In Starbucks Corp.,115 the NLRB reconsidered a case 
involving face-to-face profanity upon remand from the Second 
Circuit.116  When the case was previously decided, the Board, 
applying the Atlantic Steel test, upheld an ALJ’s finding that the 
employer violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by terminating 
employee Joseph Agins for his union support.117  The district 
manager of the store where Agins worked prohibited employees 
from wearing union pins, and on the day prior to the incident in 
question, the manager ordered employees to remove union pins 
or be sent home.118  The next day, while off duty, Agins was 
engaged in union activity when he swore at Yablon, an off-duty 
assistant manager from another Starbucks store, in front of 
customers at the Starbucks store where Agins worked.119  The 
ALJ found that Yablon asked Agins about Agins’s father’s 
support of the union, and that Agins then brought up Yablon’s 
earlier derogatory remarks to Agins’s father, which had occurred 
at an event where Agins and his father were distributing union 
promotional materials.120  Thereafter, the conversation grew into 
an argument with both men speaking loudly and using 
obscenities and vulgar hand gestures.121  Agins told Yablon:  “You 
can go fuck yourself, if you want to fuck me up, go ahead, I’m 
here.”122  Friends of Agins calmed him down, and the assistant 
manager in the store told Yablon to “leave it alone,” whereupon 
Yablon “chuckled” and left the store.123  Agins did not swear at or 
threaten the assistant store manager who was on duty; instead, 
he listened and remained seated while being admonished after 
the incident.124 
 
?
115 Starbucks IV, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 2736112 (June 16, 2014). 
116 Id. at *1; see generally NLRB v. Starbucks Corp. (Starbucks III), 679 F.3d 70 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
117 See Starbucks Corp. (Starbucks II), 355 N.L.R.B. 636 (2010); see also 
Starbucks Corp. (Starbucks I), 354 N.L.R.B. 876 (2009). 
118 Starbucks IV, 2014 WL 2736112, at *2. 
119 Id. at *1–2. 
120 Id. at *2 & n.6. 
121 Id. at *2. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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Agins had been involved in an incident six months earlier, 
where he asked Tanya James, the same assistant manager who 
intervened with Yablon, for help, but there was a delay, and 
when she arrived to help, he said “about damn time” and angrily 
put a blender in the sink; Agins then said “this is bullshit” and 
told James to “do everything your damn self.”125  Agins was 
suspended for several days over this misbehavior, and he 
apologized upon his return.126  The employer testified that it 
prepared a written warning that Agins would be terminated if he 
repeated this behavior, but interestingly, the ALJ credited 
Agins’s testimony that he never received the alleged written 
warning.127 
Agins was terminated several weeks after the latter incident 
with Yablon, and the discharge memorandum indicated that he 
was not eligible for rehire because he “was insubordinate and 
threatened the store manager” and because he “strongly 
support[ed] the IWW union.”128  The Board’s General Counsel 
argued that Agins’s discharge was unlawful, applying analysis 
from both Atlantic Steel and Wright Line.129  The Second Circuit 
agreed with the Board’s findings of interference with protected 
activity regarding, among other things: the employer prohibiting 
employees discussing the union while off duty; rules preventing 
talking about terms and conditions of employment; a 
discriminatory prohibition regarding use of the bulletin board for 
non-work items, including union materials; and discriminatory 
work assignments.130  However, the court made clear that the 
four-factor Atlantic Steel analysis was inappropriate in a case 
where an employee outburst occurs in front of customers because 
the employer has a legitimate concern to prevent such a public 
outburst from happening.131  Rather, the court noted that the 
Atlantic Steel test is geared to an outburst on the factory floor or 
a back room.132  The first factor from Atlantic Steel is the place of 
the outburst, but the concern in Atlantic Steel was whether other 
?
125 Id. at *1. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at *2. 
129 Id. (first citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979); then citing Wright 
Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980)). 
130 See id. at *3 n.8. 
131 See id. at *3. 
132 See id. 
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employees were present such that the outburst would impair 
employer discipline, as well as whether the outburst occurred 
during a grievance proceeding or contract negotiations.133  Upon 
remand, the court instructed the Board to determine “what 
standard should apply when an employee, ‘while discussing 
employment issues, utters obscenities in the presence of 
customers.’ ”134 
The Board on remand in Starbucks accepted the Second 
Circuit’s ruling regarding the inappropriateness of the Atlantic 
Steel analysis to the instant case.135  The majority of the panel 
then simply assumed that Agins lost the protection of the Act 
when he engaged in the obscene outburst in front of customers, 
but nonetheless managed to find protection for Agins in a Wright 
Line analysis.136  Under Wright Line, the “direct, documentary 
evidence of unlawful motivation” was provided by the antiunion 
animus that appeared in the employer’s written record of the 
discharge decision, where the reasons cited for firing Agins 
concluded with the fact that he strongly supported the union.137  
As the Board noted, the General Counsel must establish, “by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that an employee’s union 
activities were a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to 
take adverse action against the employee.”138  The three elements 
needed to prove an employer’s unlawful motive are: union 
activity by the employee, the employer’s knowledge of such, and 
antiunion animus.139  All of these elements were readily present 
on the facts in the Starbucks case, and thus the General Counsel 
met its burden.140 
Once the General Counsel met its burden under the Wright 
Line test, the burden then shifted to the employer to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the 
same action absent Agins’s protected activities.141  The employer 
?
133 See id. 
134 Id. (quoting Starbucks III, 679 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at *3–5. It is not all that common to see such blatant evidence of 
antiunion animus in written documentation of an adverse employment decision, and 
it was clear that this language was critical to the Board’s decision. 
138 Id. at *3. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at *4. 
141 Id. 
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alleged that Agins was discharged in accordance with the final 
warning sent to him in May, and that the employer was following 
valid rules in discharging him, but the Board found that the 
record did not support that version of events.142  Rather, the 
Board found that the employer treated other employees less 
harshly, even when their misconduct was worse.143  The Board 
noted that Agins’s misconduct was provoked by a supervisor who 
engaged in the same profanity, and yet the supervisor was not 
disciplined.144  Equally damning to the employer’s defense was its 
incomplete evidence as to the source of the decision to discharge 
Agins, as well as its “exaggerated version” of Agins’s conduct and 
interpersonal issues, all of which the ALJ discredited.145  The 
ALJ so noted, and the Board agreed, that the assertion of false 
reasons for the employment action created an inference that the 
real reason was unlawful.146  Moreover, the Board took into 
account the fact that the ALJ credited Agins’s testimony that he 
never received the final written warning after the May 
incident.147  Finally, the Board emphasized that despite the 
earlier May incident for which Agins was disciplined, six months 
had passed, and the direct evidence of unlawful motivation in his 
discharge record made it difficult to believe that Agins would 
have been discharged even if he had not engaged in protected 
activity.148  Thus, the Board ruled that even if it assumed Agins’s 
November 21 actions—cursing at Yablon in public—exceeded the 
Act’s protection, his discharge was unlawful under a Wright Line 
analysis.149  In effect, the Board ordered his reinstatement with 
backpay, the removal of adverse information in his employment 
record, and notice posting to not commit ULPs in the future.150 
Board Member Miscimarra concurred in the Starbucks 
decision, agreeing that the record supported the finding that 
Agins’s discharge violated the NLRA in accordance with the 
Wright Line analysis.151  However, Miscimarra objected to the 
?
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at *5. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at *5–6. 
151 Id. at *8 (Member Miscimarra, concurring). 
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majority’s failure to create a standard for retail employees who 
engage in misconduct in front of customers because, in his view, 
that was what the Second Circuit requested of the Board when it 
remanded the case.152  In Miscimarra’s view, the appellate court 
specifically outlined the inappropriateness of the Atlantic Steel 
test to the retail setting, where employers have a legitimate 
concern that employee outbursts not contain obscenities in front 
of customers.153  Miscimarra also expressed concern because the 
court noted that Agins was off duty, but on the employer’s 
premises, at the time of his outburst, and while the court 
directed the Board to address this specific situation, the majority 
failed to do so.154  Miscimarra recommended adopting the 
standard that the Board used in its earlier Restaurant Horikawa 
decision,155 which provides that “retail employees lose the Act’s 
protection if their conduct causes disruption of or interference 
with the business.”156  Further, Miscimarra would apply the rule 
that retail employees who are off duty but inside the store, and 
who engage in disruptive conduct in the presence of customers, 
lose the protection of the Act.157  He noted that the Act does not 
permit employees who are either on or off duty to occupy, disrupt 
or interfere with normal operations.158  Miscimarra found that 
Agins’s conduct met this standard and thus lost the Act’s 
protection; he noted that the ALJ also found that Agins’s actions 
were disruptive, and that the argument could have resulted in a 
disruption of business.159 
The Board’s decision in Starbucks was limited to its unique 
facts—facts that weighed against the employer in light of its 
confused managerial decision making, as well as the damning 
direct evidence of antiunion animus in Agins’s discharge 
paperwork.  Thus, the majority opinion in Starbucks left some 
questions remaining regarding the general standard that the  
 
 
?
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at *9. 
155 Id. at *9 (citing G.T.A. Enters., Inc. (Restaurant Horikawa), 260 N.L.R.B. 197 
(1982)). 
156 Id. at *9; see also Restaurant Horikawa, 260 N.L.R.B. at 198. 
157 Starbucks IV, 2014 WL 2736112, at *10 (Member Miscimarra, concurring). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at *10–11. 
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Board will apply to profanity in the retail store context—as 
opposed to on the shop floor—in the absence of direct evidence of 
unlawful motivation. 
D. Pacific Bell Telephone Company: A Case of Double Entendre 
on Union Buttons 
In Pacific Bell Telephone Co.,160 the Board considered a case 
that arose in the context of negotiating a new collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”).161  The prior CBA contained a 
Branded Apparel Program (“BAP”) provision in the appendix for 
dress code that included branded shirts for professional 
appearance.162  During the bargaining, the parties agreed to 
display initials for both the company and the union on the BAP 
shirts, but mention of the latter was not included in the CBA 
appendix.163  Upon expiration of the 2009-2012 CBA, the union 
distributed buttons that said, among other things: “WTF, 
Where’s The Fairness,” “FTW Fight To Win,” and “CUT the 
CRAP!  Not My Healthcare.”164  The technicians who wore and 
refused to remove these dual-meaning union pins and stickers 
were not dispatched into the field, and instead were sent home 
without pay.165  The Board found that these buttons and stickers 
were “not so vulgar and offensive as to cause employees wearing 
them to lose the protection of the Act.”166  The fact that the 
acronyms contained a nonprofane, nonoffensive interpretation on 
the face of the buttons and stickers alleviated the concern that 
they were inherently inflammatory.167  The Board also found that 
the “CUT the CRAP!  Not My Healthcare” slogan was neither so 
vulgar nor so obscene as to lose the Act’s protection.168 
The Board noted that § 7 encompasses the right of employees 
to wear union insignia and buttons at work.169  The burden is on 
the employer to establish special circumstances that would 
?
160 362 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 2015 WL 3492100 (June 2, 2015). 
161 Id. at *1. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at *2. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at *3. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at *4. 
169 Id. (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801–03 (1945)). 
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outweigh this right and justify a restriction.170  Merely wearing a 
uniform is insufficient justification, as is customer exposure to 
the union insignia.171  The NLRB found that the employer did not 
demonstrate special circumstances, that the union did not waive 
its right to bargain about the issue of appearance, and that the 
employer inconsistently enforced its BAP, having allowed many 
non-BAP buttons, stickers, and caps that were both union-
affiliated and not.172  In addition, the employer’s ban included all 
union insignia, not just those that it deemed offensive as overtly 
vulgar or obscene.173 
It is interesting to compare the Pacific Bell case with a few 
other recent Board and court rulings in cases also involving pins 
and insignia.  In another such case involving pins and insignia 
but not profanity, the NLRB found that car dealer Boch Honda 
violated the Act with its overbroad social media policy, which 
included, among other things, a prohibition on using the 
employer’s logos in any manner, and its dress code, which banned 
use of pins, insignias, and message clothing for employees in 
contact with the public.174  The Board majority determined that 
these policies interfered with employee engagement in protected 
concerted activities, and noted that the dress code prohibition on 
employees’ right to wear union insignia was overly broad and not 
justified by special circumstances.175 
In an earlier telephone company apparel case not involving 
profanity, shirts donned in support of a union in its negotiations 
with AT&T Connecticut read “Inmate #” on the front and 
“Prisoner of AT$T” on the back.176  The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor 
of AT&T, refusing to enforce the NLRB’s order that it was an 
ULP for the company to insist that employees visiting customer 
?
170 Id. (citing Komatsu Am. Corp., 342 N.L.R.B. 649, 650 (2004)). 
171 Id. (first citing P.S.K. Supermarkets, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 34, 35 (2007); then 
citing Meijer, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 50, 50 (1995); and then citing United Parcel Serv., 
312 N.L.R.B. 596, 596–98 (1993)). 
172 Id. at *5. 
173 Id. The employer’s ban included buttons saying “No on Prop 32,” a 
controversial political position that the employer did not want customers assuming 
it endorsed. Id. at *6. The Board, however, found that the wearing of such buttons 
was also protected by § 7 of the NLRA. Id. 
174 Boch Imps., Inc. (Boch Honda), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 2015 WL 1956199, at 
*1–2 (Apr. 30, 2015). 
175 Id. at *3. 
176 S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 2011 WL 1090112, at *1 (Mar. 
24, 2011). 
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homes or working in public remove the shirts or be suspended.177  
The court discussed making a decision based upon common 
sense, noting that customers could believe that the employees 
were prisoners, and customers in Connecticut could be concerned 
in light of a local triple murder resulting from a home invasion.178  
The court looked to the “special circumstances” exception in 
Republic Aviation before it stated:  “The ultimate question for the 
Board in any individual case is whether the employer has shown 
a reasonable belief that the particular apparel may harm the 
employer’s relationship with its customers or its public image.”179 
Last, in its NLRB v. Starbucks Corp.180 decision, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the Board went too far 
in invalidating Starbucks’ one-button limit for employees in light 
of the company’s legitimate managerial interest in its public 
image and the fact that it permitted one union button.181  Clearly, 
appellate courts seem reluctant to adopt the Board’s broad stance 
in support of § 7 protected expression when doing so comes at the 
expense of the employer’s reputation or image.  Nonetheless, the 
Board and ALJs continue to adopt the view that employer 
policies on logos and insignias must not be overly broad absent 
special circumstances that justify the restriction on employees’ 
right to wear union insignia.182 
?
177 S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 793 F.3d 93, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
178 Id. at 95. 
179 Id. at 97; see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801–03 (1945). 
180 679 F.3d 70 (2012). 
181 Id. at 78. 
182 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 13-CA-114222, slip op. at 9–11, 2015 WL 
3526139 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 4, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-
114222 (finding Wal-Mart dress code while on duty was overly broad and not 
justified by special circumstances in that it required such items as logos to be small 
and not distracting). The policy provided: “Walmart logos of any size are permitted. 
Other small, non-distracting logos or graphics on shirts, pants, skirts, hats, jackets 
or coats are also permitted[.]” Id. at 1. The employer revised the policy in 2014 to 
provide that small logos were to be “no larger than the size of your associate name 
badge[.]” Id. at 3. The ALJ in Wal-Mart cited the Board’s Boch Honda decision in 
support of his opinion. Id. at 7 (citing Boch Imps., Inc. (Boch Honda), 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 83, 2015 WL 1956199 (Apr. 30, 2015)). 
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E. Cooper Tire 
In Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,183 the company had a 
longstanding collective bargaining relationship with the union 
that represented more than a thousand production and 
maintenance workers at its Findlay facility.184  During a brief 
period when a prior collective bargaining agreement had expired, 
and after the company made its last, best, final offer, the union 
members voted not to ratify the agreement, and the company 
locked out the bargaining unit employees.185  The company 
continued to operate with supervisors, managers, and 
replacement workers, as the parties continued to bargain while 
the locked-out employees maintained peaceful picket lines.186  On 
the evening of a hog roast sponsored by the union at the union 
hall adjacent to the picket line, a number of attendees joined the 
picket line.187  Tempers flared, and the locked-out employees 
exhibited profanity and vulgar gestures towards the “scabs” who 
were taking their jobs, as evidenced on security video.188  When a 
locked-out employee, Runion, denigrated a replacement worker’s 
diet as consisting of Kentucky Fried Chicken and watermelon, 
his remark led to his discharge in light of the company’s policy 
against racial harassment.189 
The union filed a grievance alleging that Runion’s discharge 
was not for “just cause.”190  The arbitrator, however, upheld the 
discharge in light of the employer’s racial harassment policy, 
finding that the misconduct was serious, especially in the context 
of the picket line where comments could escalate into violence.191  
The NLRB refused to defer to the arbitration award, and issued a 
complaint against Cooper Tire.192  The Board’s General Counsel 
?
183 No. 08-CA-087155, 2015 WL 3544120 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 5, 2015), 
available at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA-087155. 
184 Id. at 2. 
185 Id. at 2–3. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 3. 
188 Id. at 3–5. 
189 Id. at 6. The policy prohibited harassment based upon race including 
unwelcome comments or conduct relating to race “which fails to respect the dignity 
and feelings of any Cooper employee.” Id. The policy provided that “Cooper 
employees found to be harassing others will be subject to disciplinary action, up to 
and including discharge.” Id. 
190 Id. at 6–7. 
191 Id. at 7. 
192 Id. 
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raised the issue that the arbitrator did not consider whether the 
conduct was protected under the NLRA and whether the award 
was repugnant to the Act.193  The General Counsel noted that an 
African-American employee who called his supervisor a “dumb 
white hillbilly asshole” was merely suspended and not discharged 
as Runion was, thus arguing that Runion’s punishment for a 
racial remark was too severe.194 
As the ALJ noted in Cooper Tire, picketing is protected by § 7 
of the Act, and personal confrontation is a necessary part of 
picketing to accomplish the union’s cause.195  Thus, the critical 
question was whether Runion’s conduct exceeded the Act’s 
protection.196  Runion’s comments were unaccompanied by 
threats or acts of violence, and “did not tend to coerce or 
intimidate employees in the exercise of their rights under the 
Act, nor did they raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminent 
physical confrontation.”197  This was so because even though they 
were “racist, offensive, and reprehensible . . . they were not 
violent in character, and they did not contain any overt or 
implied threats to replacement workers or their property.”198  The 
ALJ outlined Board precedent to support his findings, 
illustrating examples of far worse “obscene, insulting[,] and 
indecent” statements that involved sexual and racial slurs yet 
remained protected by the Act.199 
The Board distinguishes between conduct in the workplace 
and that on the picket line, with more leeway afforded to conduct 
in the latter context as it is outside the workplace and not on 
working time.200  In addition, the ALJ in Cooper Tire noted that 
the four-factor Atlantic Steel test was inappropriate since that 
test applies to workplace conduct.201  The judge noted that the 
Board reinforced this concept in Triple Play, where it ruled that 
the Atlantic Steel test applies to balancing employee rights 
?
193 Id. at 8. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 10. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 11 (citing Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), 
enforced sub nom. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 
1985)). 
198 Id. at 12. 
199 Id. at 12–13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
200 Id. at 14. 
201 Id. at 14–15 & n.15 (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979)). 
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against the employer’s interest in maintaining control over the 
workplace, a concern that generally arises in cases involving 
face-to-face communications, as opposed to Facebook 
comments.202  The ALJ in Cooper Tire found that under the 
relevant precedent regarding picket line activity, Runion’s 
conduct was protected so that his discharge violated the Act, and 
deferral to the arbitration award was inappropriate.203  The ALJ 
reasoned that the arbitrator did not consider Runion’s rights 
under the NLRA, nor did he apply well-established Board 
precedent, instead applying a standard providing for less leeway 
on a picket line than in the workplace, which was “palpably 
wrong” and thus clearly repugnant to the Act.204  The arbitrator’s 
limited consideration of  the cause for discharge to the context of 
the collective bargaining agreement and the company’s policy 
against racial harassment did not encompass whether the cause 
was “imposed for a reason that is prohibited by the Act,” such as 
engaging in protected concerted activity.205  The fact that Runion 
made two racist statements was insufficient to remove his 
picketing activity from the protection of the Act, and the ALJ 
ordered him reinstated with backpay.206 
III. SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 
The next four cases involved employer actions regarding 
employee communications on social media, as well as employer 
rules and discipline that unduly infringed upon employees’ § 7 
rights. 
A. Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille 
In Triple Play,207 the Board ruled that the employer violated 
the NLRA by discharging two employees for their protected 
concerted activity on Facebook.208  The social media exchange 
involved the employees’ complaints regarding their boss—the 
?
202 Id. at 15 (citing Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 
4182705, at *4 (Aug. 22, 2014)). 
203 Id. at 16. 
204 Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
205 Id. at 18–19 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 644, 647 (2007)). 
206 Id. at 19. 
207 Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705 (Aug. 22, 
2014), aff’d sub nom. Three D, LLC v. NLRB, 629 F. App’x 33 (2d Cir. 2015). 
208 Id. at *1. 
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company’s co-owner—and his incorrect handling of payroll, which 
included making inaccurate tax deductions such that employees 
owed money on their taxes.209  The Board found that the 
employer violated the NLRA by threatening legal action against 
employees for engaging in protected activity on social media and 
by maintaining its overly restrictive “Internet/Blogging” policy.210  
The Facebook communication of the employees was clearly 
concerted and fell under the “mutual aid or protection” prong of 
§ 7 of the Act.211  Thus, the Board limited its inquiry to whether 
the activity lost the protection of the Act in light of the 
employer’s legitimate interests.212 
The employees communicated on Facebook between 
themselves and with customers, complaining that because the 
owners of Triple Play were unable to do the tax paperwork 
correctly, the employees owed money; a complaint they expressed 
by posting exclamations such as “Wtf!!!!” and “I FUCKING OWE 
MONEY TOO!”213  One employee wrote that she was “calling the 
labor board to look into it [because a co-owner of Triple Play] still 
owes me about 2000 in paychecks.”214  The Facebook posts 
described the Triple Play co-owner as “a shady little 
man . . . [who probably] pocketed it all from all our paychecks.”215  
The two employees involved in the Facebook exchange were 
discharged, and one was told “she was not loyal enough” to be 
working for the company in light of her Facebook comment.216  
The second employee was terminated after interrogation 
regarding his Facebook “Like” selection with respect to the 
employees’ online discussion because he “liked the disparaging 
and defamatory comments.”217  He was told that company 
lawyers advised termination because the Facebook conversation 
was defamatory and that he would be hearing from these 
lawyers, but the employer and its lawyers did not pursue the 
matter.218 
?
209 Id. at *1–2. 
210 Id. at *1. 
211 Id. at *1. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at *2. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at *3. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
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The employer argued that the terminated employees’ 
Facebook activity lost the protection of the Act because they 
adopted defamatory and disparaging comments on a public forum 
that was accessible to employees and customers and damaged the 
company’s public image.219  The NLRB found that the four-part 
test announced in Atlantic Steel was “not well suited to address 
issues that arise in cases like this one involving employees’ off-
duty, offsite use of social media to communicate with other 
employees or with third parties.”220  This was true because 
Atlantic Steel’s four-part analysis begins with the place of 
discussion, which typically involves face-to-face communication 
in the workplace between an employee and a supervisor or 
manager.221  The Board found that the “place of discussion” factor 
from Atlantic Steel was clearly inapplicable to the facts of the 
social media discussion in Triple Play because that discussion did 
not involve confrontation with a manager or supervisor in the 
workplace.222  The NLRB noted that it has not applied Atlantic 
Steel to communications by employees with third parties.223  
Instead, the Board tested the social media conduct under its 
rulings in Jefferson Standard and Linn, and found that the 
comments were protected and the discharges unlawful under the 
Wright Line analysis.224 
The Board assessed employee Sanzone’s comment—“I owe 
too.  Such an asshole.”—as well as employee Spinella’s indication 
that he “liked” employee LaFrance’s update—“Maybe someone 
should do the owners of Triple Play a favor and buy it from them.  
They can’t even do the tax paperwork correctly!!!  Now I OWE 
money . . . Wtf!!!!”—as protected, and refused to include 
comments posted by others in the Facebook exchange.225  These 
comments were qualitatively different in the Board’s view from 
?
219 Id. at *4. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at *4–5. 
222 Id. at *4–5 & n.14 (citing Starbucks I, 354 N.L.R.B. 876, 877–78 (2009) 
(noting that the Board applied the Atlantic Steel test to confrontation between 
manager and employee in the workplace)). 
223 Id. at *4. 
224 Id. (citing NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers 
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1953); Linn v. United Plant Guard 
Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65–66 (1966); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 
1089 (1980)). 
225 Id. at *6. 
FINAL_O’BRIEN 8/25/2016  12:17 PM 
2016] FROM SHOPTALK TO SOCIAL MEDIA 83 
the disparaging communications in Jefferson Standard.226  The 
mention of a labor dispute as required for protection in Jefferson 
Standard was evidenced in Triple Play by the tax withholding 
reference, and the comments were not directed at the general 
public, nor were they so disloyal or disparaging that they lost the 
protection of the Act, as did the communications in Jefferson 
Standard.227  The purpose of the Facebook comments was mutual 
support rather than disparagement of the employer’s products or 
services.228  The comments were not defamatory because they 
were not maliciously untrue; at most, they expressed a negative 
personal opinion of the co-owner of Triple Play.229 
The Board found that the discharge of the two employees for 
their protected activity violated the NLRA, and that the 
Internet/Blogging policy in the Triple Play handbook was 
unlawfully overbroad, and thus also violated the Act, because 
employees would reasonably construe the policy as prohibiting 
protected activity.230  The policy restricted communication about 
confidential and proprietary information as well as inappropriate 
discussions about the company, management, and co-workers.231  
The use of the word “inappropriate” was “sufficiently imprecise” 
in the Board’s view, especially in light of the paucity of 
illustrative examples of prohibited conduct.232  This was 
particularly true in the context of the employer’s termination of 
two employees for their protected activity on Facebook.233  The 
Board found that the general savings clause that attempted to 
alleviate any illegal impact of the policy did not save it from 
being unlawful.234 
Board Member Miscimarra joined in most of the panel’s 
opinion in Triple Play but dissented in part regarding the 
Internet/Blogging policy, finding it lawful.235  Miscimarra 
?
226 Id. 
227 Id. at *6–7. 
228 Id. at *7. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at *8. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at *9 (citing First Transit, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 1321108, at 
*3 (Apr. 2, 2014)). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at *11 & n.3 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part) (noting he “would 
reexamine this standard in an appropriate future case”). 
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disagreed with the standard applied by the majority, particularly 
the majority’s application of the first prong of the test in 
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia.236  That prong would find an 
employer’s policy unlawful if employees would reasonably 
construe the language to prohibit § 7 activity.237  He interpreted 
Triple Play’s policy as being legitimately aimed at preventing the 
revelation of proprietary information about the company.238  The 
dissent also noted that the employer did not refer to the policy 
when it discharged the employees in question, instead saying 
that the “disloyal and defamatory” Facebook comments were the 
basis for termination.239  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s decision in a brief, 
unpublished summary order.240 
The most significant pronouncement the Board made in 
Triple Play is that it would not apply the Atlantic Steel four-
factor test when evaluating whether employee concerted activity 
on social media should retain the protection of the Act.241  
Because the “place of discussion” factor in social media situations 
is not analogous to a workplace confrontation with an employer, 
the Board found that Sanzone’s use of a single expletive to 
describe her manager on a social media website accessible to 
other offsite, off-duty employees and customers should not give 
rise to an Atlantic Steel analysis.242 
B. Bettie Page Clothing 
The NLRB reconsidered and essentially affirmed a vacated 
decision and order that the Board incorporated by reference in 
Bettie Page Clothing.243  This action was necessary because of the 
?
236 Id. at *11 (citing Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage Vill.-
Livonia), 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646–47 (2004)). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Three D, LLC v. NLRB, 629 F. App’x 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2015). The NLRB argued 
for publication of the Second Circuit’s decision in order to give the ruling 
precedential authority in the area of employees’ online speech rights. See Steven 
Trader, 2nd Circ. Order on Facebook ‘Likes’ Not Precedent, Bar Says, LAW 360, Oct. 
26, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/718813/2nd-circ-order-on-facebook-likes-
not-precedent-bar-says. 
241 Triple Play, 2014 WL 4182705, at *4. 
242 Id. at *5. 
243 Design Tech. Grp., LLC (Bettie Page Clothing II), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 2014 
WL 5524147, at *1 (Oct. 31, 2014) (Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and 
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Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, a decision 
that, in holding challenged appointments to the NLRB invalid, 
effectively undermined the authority of deciding members behind 
the Board’s earlier decision in the case.244  The Bettie Page 
Clothing case involved a clothing store in the Haight-Ashbury 
district of San Francisco, California, where employees raised 
safety and other concerns regarding working conditions to their 
supervisor and the store owner, both in person and on Facebook, 
and were terminated as a result.245  One terminated employee, 
Vanessa Morris, referenced the California Worker’s Rights 
Handbook on Facebook and, noting that her mother worked for a 
law firm specializing in labor law, stated, “BOY will you be 
surprised by all the crap that’s going on that’s in violation.”246 
The ALJ in Bettie Page Clothing did not credit the 
supervisor’s testimony that another one of the terminated 
employees called her a “bitch.”247  The NLRB ruled that the 
employees had engaged in protected concerted activity because 
they had raised concerns regarding terms and conditions of 
employment as well as mutual aid and protection, and thus were 
entitled to reinstatement, backpay, and rescission of the 
employer’s unlawful handbook rules.248  The company sought 
review of the Board’s order; briefs have been filed and oral 
arguments have been heard by the D.C. Circuit.249 
 
?
Schiffer) (affirming the rationale of the vacated decision and order in Design Tech. 
Grp., LLC (Bettie Page Clothing I), 359 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 2013 WL 1753561 (Apr. 19, 
2013) (Chairman Pearce and Members Griffin and Block)). The appointments of 
Members Griffin and Block were deemed invalid in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. 
Ct. 2550 (2014). 
244 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578. 
245 Bettie Page Clothing I, 2013 WL 1753561, at *8–11. 
246 Id. at *11. 
247 Id. at *12. 
248 Id. at *1–3. 
249 See Design Tech. Grp. LLC Docket Activity, https://www.nlrb.gov/case/20-
CA-035511 (last visited June 6, 2016), for access to the company’s Petition for 
Review by the D.C. Circuit (Nov. 7, 2014), as well as the final Brief for the NLRB 
(May 8, 2015). The parties argued the appeal before the circuit court on January 1, 
2016. Id. 
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C. Pier Sixty 
In Pier Sixty, LLC,250 the NLRB found in favor of a banquet 
server who was discharged for engaging in § 7 protected activity 
on Facebook, despite the profanities he expressed against his 
immediate boss.251  The employees of a Manhattan catering 
company began organizing a union in part because of the 
degrading, disrespectful, and undignified treatment they 
purportedly were receiving from their immediate managers.252  
The employees brought complaints to the director of banquet 
services.253  Later, just two days before the scheduled union 
election, servers were harassed for talking together at a function; 
they were told by the Assistant Director of Banquets, Robert 
McSweeney, not to talk and to spread out.254  A server named 
Perez took a break and used his iPhone to post the following on 
his Facebook page:  “Bob is such a NASTY MOTHER FUCKER 
don’t know how to talk to people!!!!!!  Fuck his mother and his 
entire fucking family!!!!  What a LOSER!!!!  Vote YES for the 
UNION!!!!!!!”255  The post remained up until the day after the 
election.256  When management became aware of the post, they 
asked McSweeney about the night of the posting, and he 
maintained that nothing out of the ordinary had occurred.257  
Perez was terminated for his comments.258  The ALJ found that 
vulgarity and profanity were rampant at the employer’s 
workplace among both employees and managers and that such 
conduct did not result in discipline for others.259  The Board 
agreed with the ALJ that Perez’s Facebook comments constituted 
protected concerted activity because they related to mistreatment 
of employees and sought to improve matters by supporting the  
 
 
 
?
250 Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
251 Id. at *5. 
252 Id. at *1. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at *2. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
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union in the upcoming election.260  The NLRB also agreed with 
the ALJ that Perez’s comments were not so egregious that he lost 
the protection of the Act.261 
The Board in Pier Sixty evaluated the posting under the 
totality of the circumstances and considered the following factors 
in the record: (1) evidence of antiunion animus on the employer’s 
part; (2) whether the employer provoked Perez; (3) whether the 
conduct was impulsive or deliberate; (4) the location, subject 
matter, and nature of the post; (5) whether the employer 
considered the language offensive; (6) whether it had a rule 
against such language; and (7) whether the discipline imposed 
was equivalent to that imposed on others for like conduct.262  The 
Board noted that the employer did show hostility towards union 
activity as evidenced by ULPs in the period before the election, 
noting in particular the disparate enforcement of the employer’s 
“no talk” rule.263  The Board’s assessment of the factors supported 
its finding that Perez was provoked; his postings were an 
impulsive reaction to McSweeney’s commands and the stress 
created by months of protesting disrespectful treatment of 
servers.264  In addition, the Board noted that the employer 
tolerated profane language, which was widespread at the 
catering company, and that Perez’s reference to McSweeney’s 
family was designed merely to intensify the insult, just as other 
managers had done to employees.265  The location and subject 
matter of the posting weighed in favor of retaining protection of 
the Act since Perez was standing alone outside on break and was 
not disrupting the work environment or customers, and his 
comments only referenced previous complaints and encouraged 
union support.266 
While the employer had a policy regarding “Other Forms of 
Harassment,” which it cited in its discharge of Perez, the policy 
did not reference use of vulgar or offensive language in general; 
rather, the policy addressed such language when directed at 
protected classifications or statuses, none of which applied to 
?
260 Id. at *3. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at *4. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
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Perez’s comments about McSweeney.267  Further, the employer 
had issued five written warnings to other employees for use of 
obscene language since 2005, yet no discharges resulted, even in 
cases where the employee was also insubordinate to a supervisor, 
which the Board did not find occurred in Perez’s case.268  Thus, 
the discharge of Perez exceeded the discipline meted out to 
others, and the employer violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.269 
Board Member Johnson dissented in part in Pier Sixty, 
finding that Perez’s Facebook comments were both vulgar and 
obscene, that they lost the Act’s protection, and that his 
discharge was not an ULP.270  He agreed with the ALJ that the 
“no talk” rule was disparately enforced, violating § 8(a)(1).271  
However, Johnson determined that under the “totality of the 
circumstances,” the employer was entitled to discipline Perez for 
his “offensive online rant, which was fraught with insulting and 
obscene vulgarities directed toward his manager and his 
manager’s mother and family,” and which Johnson categorized as 
“outrageous, individualized griping” that was “blatantly uncivil 
and opprobrious behavior.”272  Johnson noted that the posting 
was in fact publicly available.273  Applying the totality of the 
circumstances analysis, Johnson found that the comments were 
not made impulsively, but rather deliberately; that they were left 
up for three days so that they could reach a broader audience of 
nonemployee friends; and that they contained an obscene, 
personal, and vicious attack on McSweeney and his family that 
was “qualitatively different” from other obscenity that the 
employer tolerated in the workplace.274  The dissent criticized the 
Board panel’s analysis of the totality of the circumstances as “an 
Atlantic Steel test on steroids that is even more susceptible to 
manipulation based upon ‘agency whim’ than the 4-factor 
Atlantic Steel test.”275  Johnson found that Perez’s posting 
contained “a level of animus and aggression” toward McSweeney 
?
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at *5. 
270 Id. (Member Johnson, dissenting in part). 
271 Id. at *5 & n.2. 
272 Id. at *5. 
273 Id. at *5 & n.3. 
274 Id. at *5. 
275 Id. (footnote omitted). 
FINAL_O’BRIEN 8/25/2016  12:17 PM 
2016] FROM SHOPTALK TO SOCIAL MEDIA 89 
that exceeded other statements that were tolerated.276  He saw no 
merit in allowing employees to post statements that “cause 
irreparable damage to working relationships” simply because the 
behavior “happens to overlap with protected activity.”277 
The panel opinion in Pier Sixty once again reflects the 
Board’s departure from the Atlantic Steel test in social media 
cases, with reference to its decision in Triple Play.278  The Board 
adopts the ALJ’s alternative test in Pier Sixty, namely “the 
totality of the circumstances.”279  The Board then incorporates a 
checklist of relevant factors in assessing whether a social media 
post that is otherwise protected by the Act should retain 
protection.280  These factors include the presence of antiunion 
animus and provocation, as well as whether the conduct at issue 
was tolerated by the employer and whether the discipline was 
disproportionate to that meted out to others who had not engaged 
in protected concerted activity.281 
D. Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Center 
In yet another banquet server case, an NLRB ALJ found that 
the employer violated the NLRA by terminating a server named 
Santiago for her Facebook posts that violated the employer’s 
handbook rule prohibiting disloyalty.282  The ALJ ruled that the 
employer’s disloyalty rule was overbroad and thus unlawful, and 
that three other rules were separate violations as they were 
facially unlawful.283  The ALJ determined that Santiago’s actions 
did not interfere with the work of others or the employer’s 
operations.284  The employer’s handbook policies outlined 
prohibited conduct such as “[d]isloyalty, including disparaging or 
denigrating the food, beverages, or services of the company, its 
?
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. at *3 (majority opinion) (citing Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. 
No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705, at *3 (Aug. 22, 2014)). 
279 Id. (citing Richmond Dist. Neighborhood Ctr., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 2014 WL 
5465462, at *2 & n.6 (Oct. 28, 2014) (examining the egregiousness of the conduct 
under all the circumstances)). 
280 Id. at *3. 
281 Id. 
282 Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Ctr., LLC, No. 13-CA-141609, slip op. at 1 
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 16, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-141609. 
283 Id. at 1–2, 8–10. 
284 Id. at 1. 
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guests, associates, or supervisors by making or publishing false 
or malicious statements.”285  Further, the employer prohibited 
unauthorized use of a telephone or frequent, unnecessary use of a 
telephone for personal business, or cell phone use during work 
hours, except for breaks.286  The employer had employees sign a 
standard operating procedure where they agreed to restrictions 
on cell phone use.287 
In Tinley Park Hotel, while on break during her shift, 
Santiago used her cell phone and allowed others to use it to take 
photos and post them on Facebook along with commentary, 
including remarks that she was working like a slave, all of which 
violated company policy.288  Santiago denied such use when 
interviewed by her supervisors because she was fearful of losing 
her job.289  Nonetheless, the ALJ ruled that the hotel and 
convention center operator ran afoul of the NLRA when it fired 
Santiago for violating company policy and damaging the 
reputation of the business; the ALJ also ruled that the employer 
had unlawfully maintained three other rules that unduly 
restricted protected concerted activity.290  The ALJ noted that “an 
employer does not escape liability for an unlawful discharge 
because it asserts other, lawful reasons for the same disciplinary 
action.”291  The employer’s assertion that it discharged Santiago 
for violating its lawful cell phone rule did not obviate the fact 
that she was also discharged for violating an unlawful rule—
namely, violating the employer’s disloyalty rule by posting photos 
with derogatory comments that depicted the company in an 
unfavorable light.292  Limited exceptions were filed to the ALJ’s 
decision by the General Counsel’s office, exceptions seeking  
 
 
 
?
285 Id. at 2. 
286 Id. at 3. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 3–5. 
289 Id. at 5. 
290 See id. at 8–10; Jeff Zalesin, Hotel Worker Wrongly Fired over Posting Selfies, 
NLRB Says, LAW 360, June 17, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/669067/hotel-
worker-wrongly-fired-over-posting-selfies-nlrb-says. 
291 Tinley Park, slip op. at 7 (citing A.T. & S.F. Mem’l Hosps., Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 
436, 436 (1978)). 
292 Id. 
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reimbursement for the complainant’s work search expenses and 
requiring the employer to notify employees of rescinded unlawful 
rules in accordance with the Board’s decision in Purple 
Communications, Inc.293 
IV. PROFANITY ON UNION MATERIALS ON BREAKROOM WALL—
OH WHAT A TANGLED WEB HE WEAVES . . . 
The final case in the top ten involves employee dishonesty in 
response to an employer investigation prompted by employee 
complaints regarding sexual harassment that related to profane 
words and drawings. 
In Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc.,294 decided in 2015, 
the NLRB ruled that employee Grosso, who lied at an 
investigation about scribbling “vulgar, offensive, 
and . . . arguably threatening statements” on union materials 
relating to a decertification election, had initially engaged in 
protected activity, but his employer was justified in discharging 
him in light of his subsequent dishonesty.295  The Board found 
that the company investigation was a good faith response to 
complaints from female employees about the comments.296  The 
Board had issued a 2012 decision in the case that found that 
Grosso’s discharge violated the Act, but the appointments of two 
of the three deciding Board members were later deemed invalid 
in NLRB v. Noel Canning,297 thus requiring the Board to review 
de novo the ALJ’s decision, the record, exceptions, and briefs.298  
Interestingly, prior to the Board’s 2012 decision, an ALJ found 
that the employer had not violated the NLRA by discharging 
Grosso.299 
?
293 See General Counsel’s Limited Exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s 
Decision and Arguments in Support of the Exceptions at 1–2, Tinley Park Hotel & 
Convention Ctr., LLC, No. 13-CA-141609 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 16, 2015) 
(citing Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 2014 WL 4764786, at *6 (Sept. 
24, 2014)), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-141609. 
294 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (Fresenius II), 2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015). 
295 Id. at *1. 
296 Id. 
297 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014). 
298 Fresenius II, 2015 WL 3932160, at *1. 
299 See Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc. (Fresenius I), 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012 WL 
4165822, at *34 (Sept. 19, 2012) (incorporating the ALJ’s decision where ALJ found 
only one ULP occurred, namely, the employer instructing employee Grosso not to 
discuss the investigation with other employees). 
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On the facts as outlined in the Board’s 2012 decision, Grosso, 
a union supporter, was concerned about an upcoming NLRB 
election where he feared that the union would be voted out.300  
Grosso feared this election result because, after the union had 
won an earlier election to represent two bargaining units of 
drivers and warehouse workers at Fresenius’s Chester, New York 
manufacturing facility, the parties were unsuccessful in 
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement.301  Grosso wrote 
the following statements on union newsletters in the employee 
breakroom: “Dear Pussies, Please Read!” “Hey cat food lovers, 
how’s your income doing?” and “Warehouse workers, RIP.”302  
When several female warehouse workers complained to 
management, one noted that she recognized the handwriting and 
produced driver logs for comparison.303  Based upon this evidence, 
the Vice President and a senior director interviewed Grosso, who 
denied writing the remarks.304  The next day Grosso mistakenly 
dialed the Vice President of the company; he thought he had 
dialed a union representative.305  During the call, Grosso 
admitted writing the remarks on the newsletters, and the Vice 
President identified himself and ordered Grosso in to work where 
he suspended him.306  He admonished Grosso not to discuss the 
investigation with others.307  The human resources manager 
decided to discharge Grosso after reviewing the information, 
including the written complaints, basing the termination decision 
upon Grosso’s comments on the newsletters as well as his 
dishonesty.308 
In the trial before the ALJ, Grosso attempted to justify his 
comments as indicating that the warehouse workers were 
“spineless,” that they needed to “man up,” and that the “RIP” 
referred to the fact that they were headed towards loss of their 
?
300 Id. at *1. 
301 Id. Fresenius is a manufacturer and distributor of disposable items for 
dialysis. Id. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at *2. There was no mention of Grosso requesting the assistance of a 
union representative at this interview, and in both of its decisions the Board found 
that the interview was properly conducted by the employer. Id. at *4; Fresenius II, 
362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *2 (June 24, 2015). 
305 Fresenius I, 2012 WL 4165822, at *2. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
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souls.309  The judge noted that sanctions for profanity at 
Fresenius were usually minor reprimands.310  Nonetheless, under 
the Atlantic Steel analysis, the ALJ found that Grosso lost the 
protection of the Act because of the location and nature of his 
comments and the lack of employer provocation.311  The 2012 
Board, however, found that Grosso did not lose the protection of 
the Act because the location, subject matter, and nature of his 
comments favored continued protection even though the 
provocation factor was “neutral.”312  In its 2012 decision, the 
NLRB found that the ALJ had conflated the location of the 
comments—the breakroom—with their nature—their anonymity 
and threatening quality—and had thus incorrectly found that the 
location and manner weighed against retaining the Act’s 
protection.313 
In contrast to the ALJ’s opinion, the 2012 Board found that 
the subject matter of the comments was an exercise of § 7 rights; 
that the nature of the outburst was impulsive; and that, while 
the outburst was vulgar and could be deemed “demeaning to 
women,” it nonetheless was not so egregious when evaluated in 
the context of a workplace where profanity was common and not 
subject to heavy sanctions.314  Similarly, the 2012 Board decision 
found the “RIP” comment to contain ambiguity such that, in 
context, it was not so threatening as to lose protection.315  Even 
though the comments were anonymous, the Board felt that 
because they were not anonymous for long, as another employee 
identified the handwriting and passed her insight on to 
management, and because their author had no record of violence, 
the comments were not all that disruptive and therefore 
remained protected.316 
Thus, even though there was no showing of provocation, the 
2012 Board found that the balance of the Atlantic Steel factors 
weighed in favor of protection for Grosso’s comments.317  In its 
2012 Fresenius decision, the Board looked at the totality of the 
?
309 Id. 
310 Id. at *3. 
311 Id. at *5. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. at *6. 
314 Id. at *6–7. 
315 Id. at *8. 
316 Id. at *8–9. 
317 Id. at *9. 
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circumstances, including, among others, the Atlantic Steel 
factors.318  The decision also considered the fact that another 
incident that did not involve protected activity but did involve 
profanity—an employee pasted a “DON’T BE A DICK” sticker on 
a piece of equipment that employees and customers could see—
had resulted in only minor discipline, all of which led to a 
determination that Grosso’s comments should remain 
protected.319  Board Member Hayes dissented in part to the 2012 
decision, finding that Grosso’s comments should lose the Act’s 
protection because remarks that coworkers reasonably deem 
“harassing and sexually insulting” are disruptive to productivity, 
and an employee who lies in an investigation relating to sexually 
harassing remarks should not be protected by the NLRA simply 
because he wants to “conceal [his] participation in union 
activity.”320 
The Board’s 2015 decision in the Fresenius case noted that 
Grosso engaged in two acts of dishonesty:  He denied authoring 
the comments during the company’s investigation, and he sought 
to conceal his identity after mistakenly confessing his 
participation to the Vice President.321  The 2015 panel was 
divided in its view of the protection afforded the handwritten 
statements with Board Member Johnson finding that the 
statements were not protected.322  However, in light of the 
Board’s assumption that even if the comments were otherwise 
protected they lost protection because of Grosso’s dishonesty, the 
Board was united in its decision that Fresenius did not violate 
the Act by discharging Grosso.323 
The Board found that Fresenius had a legitimate interest in 
investigating the harassing and threatening comments because 
doing so related to the company’s ability to effectively operate its 
business, to follow its antiharassment policy, and to comply with 
federal and state antidiscrimination laws.324  Additionally, the 
Board found that the employer carried out the investigation in a 
lawful manner that was “reasonably tailored” and “consistent 
?
318 Id. at *10. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. at *13 & n.1 (Member Hayes, dissenting in part). 
321 Fresenius II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *1 (June 24, 2015). 
322 Id. at *1 n.2. 
323 Id. at *1. 
324 Id. at *2. 
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with the purpose of [the] investigation.”325  The employer did not 
ask Grosso about his union activities or the union brochures, 
focusing instead on the handwritten comments that were 
purportedly vulgar, harassing, threatening, and offensive.326  In 
the Board’s view, there was no evidence of antiunion animus on 
the employer’s part, notwithstanding the fact that the employer 
infringed § 7 rights when it admonished Grosso not to discuss the 
investigation with others.327  The Board found that Fresenius met 
its Wright Line burden of showing that it would have discharged 
Grosso for dishonesty, even absent his protected activity, in light 
of the employer’s past record of discharging two other employees 
who were dishonest concerning a kickback investigation.328 
V. COMPARING AND ANALYZING NLRB CASES INVOLVING 
PROFANITY PLUS DISHONESTY 
One apparent inconsistency among the NLRB profanity 
cases appears to be that the NLRB has protected employees who 
engaged in dishonesty during investigations in some cases, but 
not in others.  In Cooper Tire,329 managers perceived that racial 
harassment occurred on the picket line, and even though the 
employee denied the conduct, the ALJ concluded that he was 
responsible for the harassing remarks, and yet found that the 
conduct remained protected activity and ordered the employee 
reinstated.330  In contrast, the Board found that sexually 
harassing conduct took the employee outside the Act’s protection 
in Fresenius because the employee lied during the investigation 
of materials defaced in the employee breakroom.331  The fact that 
the offensive material in Fresenius was actually placed in the 
workplace in the employee breakroom is important when 
compared to the off-duty remarks of a locked-out employee on a 
picket line that were made to replacement workers as in Cooper 
Tire.  This is because the context in Fresenius was the workplace 
and work hours, whereas the context in Cooper Tire was outside 
?
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. at *3 (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980)). 
329 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 08-CA-087155, 2015 WL 3544120 (N.L.R.B. 
Div. of Judges June 5, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA-087155. 
330 Id. at 20. 
331 Fresenius II, 2015 WL 3932160, at *3. 
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work and off duty.  The ALJ noted in Cooper Tire that picketing 
activity is evaluated by a different standard than workplace 
activity, and deemed the employee’s conduct protected because it 
was not violent or threatening, nor did it tend to coerce or 
intimidate employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights.332  
Clearly, in the midst of a lock out, employees on the picket line 
are not expected to be as civil to those who are crossing the picket 
line to work what they perceive to be their jobs as would be the 
expectation of civility amongst co-workers who are at work.  
Thus, the ALJ in Cooper Tire found that even though the 
employee denied making the racist remarks while on the picket 
line, his conduct remained protected by the Act.333  Another 
ameliorating fact was that the locked-out employee’s comments 
in Cooper Tire were not considered to be all that profane or 
offensive; rather, they involved cultural stereotypes regarding 
diet.334  In Cooper Tire, it was critical that the arbitrator did not 
understand that picket line activity, rather than activity in the 
workplace itself, allows for more impulsive and profane conduct, 
so that the arbitrator mistakenly held the locked-out employee to 
a higher standard than if he was at work rather than a lower 
standard as should have been the case.335  Thus, the ALJ noted 
that the arbitration award was repugnant to the Act, and under 
the well-established rules of labor law, the Board will not defer to 
an arbitrator’s award in such a case.336 
In contrast, the fact that the employee in Fresenius lied 
during the employer’s investigation into workplace misconduct, 
and then confessed to the conduct to a managerial employee in a 
case of mistaken identity, showed that he was responsible for the 
harassing material, and was dishonest in the face of the 
investigation, which was targeted at conduct that the employer 
was legally bound to investigate.337  Thus, the vulgar, offensive, 
and threatening handwritten statements in Fresenius were not 
protected activity even though the employee aimed to support the 
union with his comments and depictions on the union materials 
?
332 Cooper Tire, slip op. at 15–16. 
333 Id. at 5, 20. 
334 Id. at 4–5, 20. 
335 Id. at 15–16. 
336 Id. at 16–20. 
337 Fresenius I, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012 WL 4165822, at *1–2 (Sept. 19, 
2012). 
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in the breakroom.338  In addition, the subject matter in Fresenius 
involved sexual harassment where employees complained to 
management about material that was in the employee 
breakroom.  The Board strengthened its stance on complaining 
about sexual harassment to co-workers as amounting to 
concerted activity for purposes of mutual aid or protection under 
§ 7 when it specifically overturned its Holling Press, Inc. decision 
in Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc.339  In Holling Press, 
the NLRB had refused to find that conduct of an employee 
seeking help in pursuing a sexual harassment claim constituted 
concerted activity within the meaning of § 7 of the Act.340  In 
Fresh & Easy, the Board found that the conduct of an employee 
who sought the assistance of others in documenting a sexually 
harassing and profane comment/picture on a whiteboard in the 
breakroom was engaged in protected concerted activity for 
mutual aid or protection.341  When the Board overturned Holling 
Press in Fresh & Easy, it highlighted the importance of 
employers having the responsibility to investigate and remediate 
instances of sexual harassment in the workplace, and thus placed 
these investigations in a class where employers are obligated to 
act.342  Notably, the location of the offensive material in both 
Fresh & Easy and Fresenius was the employee breakroom. 
In another of the top ten profanity cases, Bettie Page 
Clothing,343 an employee lied to her supervisor.  There, the 
employee lied when she denied sending a letter to the 
supervisor’s boss, and yet the conduct remained protected by the 
NLRA because the employee merely feared admitting to her 
supervisor that she had complained about her and the working 
conditions in the letter, which the Board found was a clear 
example of conduct protected by § 7.344  It is important that the 
lie in Bettie Page was not aimed at covering up a violation of 
other lawful employer rules regarding harassment as in 
?
338 Id. at *4. 
339 Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkt., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 2014 WL 
3919910, at *1 (Aug. 11, 2014). 
340 343 N.L.R.B. 301, 301 (2004). 
341 Fresh & Easy, 2014 WL 3919910, at *1–4. 
342 Id. at *11. 
343 Bettie Page Clothing II, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 2014 WL 5524147 (Oct. 31, 
2014) (reaffirming the Board’s decision in Bettie Page Clothing I, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 
96, 2013 WL 1753561 (Apr. 19, 2013)). 
344 Bettie Page Clothing I, 2013 WL 1753561, at *1–2, *9. 
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Fresenius.  A similar situation arose in Tinley Park where the 
ALJ found that the banquet server denied using her cell phone 
and posting pictures and comments on Facebook during work 
hours because she was afraid of losing her job.345  But again, her 
conduct was deemed protected by the Act because her conduct 
related to terms and conditions of employment, the employer’s 
rules were overbroad, and the employee did not otherwise engage 
in illegal behavior.346  Thus, there were clear distinctions on the 
facts in these cases involving dishonesty.  Where the dishonesty 
involved investigation of an employee’s illegal conduct at the 
workplace, it was not protected, but where the dishonesty did not 
involve illegal conduct, it was protected.  And clearly, employee 
action that takes place in the workplace is held to a higher 
standard of civility than conduct taking place outside the 
workplace, especially conduct on a picket line. 
VI. THE TAKEAWAY FROM THE TOP TEN NLRB PROFANITY CASES: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In each of the top ten cases, certain factors were critical to 
the outcomes.  The critical factors included: the location of the 
misconduct; the presence of employer rules that violated the 
NLRA because they were overbroad and unduly interfered with 
concerted activity that was protected by § 7; provocation of 
employee(s) brought on by employer ULPs; the employer’s 
general tolerance of profanity in the workplace; the inequality of 
treatment amongst employees who engaged in similar profanity 
but who were not engaged in protected concerted activity, with 
the latter receiving more favorable treatment; whether or not the 
employee presented as violent or overly aggressive in the context 
of the profane outburst; and whether or not there was an 
employee complaint of harassment that legally required the 
employer to investigate and remedy harassment. 
The outcome in profanity cases involving employee 
dishonesty in the context of an employer investigation depends 
upon the particularized fact pattern in each case.  It is more 
likely that the employee will lose the protection of the NLRA if 
?
345 Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Ctr., No. 13-CA-141609, slip op. at 5, 2015 
WL 3759559 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 16, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-
CA-141609. 
346 Id. at 7, 10–11. 
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the misconduct occurred in the workplace and involves illegal 
conduct.  Where an employer is legally obligated to conduct an 
investigation in light of employee complaints of illegal workplace 
harassment, there is no employer ULP as long as the 
investigation is conducted appropriately, that is, within the 
bounds of its purpose, and the discipline meted out is consistent 
with other cases of dishonesty that did not involve the exercise of 
§ 7 rights. 
Remedies ordered in the top ten cases include: reinstatement 
of the complainants with backpay; posting a notice to not commit 
future ULPs; and requiring that the employer revise any illegal 
rules.  The critical factors in each case are briefly summarized in 
the next section, and the lessons learned from the cases are 
outlined with recommendations for employers and employees to 
manage workplace and social media profanity within the basic 
tenets and legal parameters of the NLRA. 
A. Face-to-Face Cases 
In Hooters,347 the employer had many rules that violated § 8 
(a)(1) of the Act, and the ALJ did not find that Hanson, the 
employee in question, engaged in the profanity that took place at 
an employer sponsored competition—profanity that the employer 
asserted as the basis for her termination.348  Thus, Hanson was 
entitled to reinstatement with backpay, and the employer was 
required to revise its many overbroad rules that interfered with 
employees’ § 7 rights and post notices.349 
In Plaza Auto,350 the Board looked to the four-factor Atlantic 
Steel test, finding: (1) the place of discussion was in the 
manager’s office, where other employees were unlikely to hear it, 
and where it was unlikely to result in disruption; (2) the subject 
matter was protected because it involved terms and conditions of 
employment, including compensation; and (3) the employee was 
provoked by the employer’s ULPs, including the remark that 
implied that if the employee did not trust them, he did not need 
?
347 Hooters of Ontario I, No. 31-CA-104872, 2014 WL 2086220 (N.L.R.B. Div. of 
Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872, aff’d, 363 N.L.R.B. 
No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098 (Sept. 1, 2015). 
348 Id. at 15, 27–28. 
349 Id. at 42–43. 
350 Plaza Auto III, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 2014 WL 2213747 (May 28, 2014). 
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to work there.351  Only the “nature of the outburst” factor from 
Atlantic Steel weighed against employee Aguirre, which was 
because his conduct involved obscene and denigrating remarks 
that were insubordinate to the owner.352  Nonetheless, the Board 
found that the other three factors that favored Aguirre retaining 
the protection of the Act outweighed the one that did not, and so 
Aguirre’s reinstatement was ordered with backpay, in addition to 
posting a notice.353 
In Starbucks,354 employee Agins’s profanity was provoked by 
a manager who expressed antiunion animus.355  The manager 
also engaged in profanity in the same interaction but was not 
disciplined, unlike Agins who was discharged.356  The Board 
looked to the employer’s written memorandum of discharge, 
which indicated that the employee was not eligible for rehire for 
three reasons.357  One of those reasons was that he supported the 
union, which the Board found to be clear record evidence of 
antiunion animus against Agins, thus preventing the employer 
from meeting its burden of proving that the employee would have 
been fired anyway under the Wright Line standard.358  Like 
Hooters, Starbucks had rules that interfered with employees 
engaging in protected concerted activity when off duty; these 
were deemed to violate the NLRA, and the NLRB ordered the 
rules revised.359  The Board ordered reinstatement of Agins with 
backpay, removal of negative references in his employment file, 
and posting a notice.360  The company’s clear statement that 
Agins’s union support was a reason not to rehire him was, in all 
likelihood, the most critical factor in this Board decision and 
illustrates just how important it is that managers are aware of 
what is an illegal reason for termination under the NLRA.361 
?
351 Id. at *11–13. 
352 Id. at *9. 
353 Id. at *16. 
354 Starbucks IV, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 2736112 (June 16, 2014). 
355 Id. at *1–3. 
356 Id. at *4. 
357 Id. 
358 Id. 
359 Id. at *3 & n.8 (noting the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit enforced the Board’s findings about these ULPs). 
360 Id. at *6. 
361 Id. at *4. 
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In Pacific Bell Telephone Co.,362 the union buttons that the 
employer objected to employees wearing in front of customers 
contained acronyms that could be read to infer profanity were it 
not for the spelled-out reference to the full words, which were not 
profane and were indicated right on the face of the pins.363  One 
pin included a vulgar word but it simply was not that bad in the 
Board’s view.364  The Board focused on the transparency of the 
pins, the right to wear the pins unless there are special 
circumstances, which was not established in the case at bar, and 
that the employer ban on union insignia was overbroad.365  The 
takeaway from this case is that an employer should be careful 
not to presume that a potential double meaning of an acronym is 
problematic if followed by an alternate innocent phrase.  
Moreover, a “light” swear does not necessarily make a union 
button something that can be prohibited absent a showing of 
special circumstances by the employer, such as a business 
necessity.  The employer should weigh such prohibitions 
carefully, especially when it has bargained with a union and 
agreed to the use of branded apparel that includes the use of a 
union logo.  In addition, employees and unions should avoid 
exceeding the limited protection for profanity outlined in this 
case. 
In Cooper Tire,366 an ALJ weighed a locked-out employee’s 
racially stereotypical comments and gestures targeting those 
crossing a picket line with the employer’s policy against racial 
harassment, and still found in favor of the employee because he 
was treated more harshly than another employee who had called 
his supervisor a racially-charged and vulgar name but was only 
suspended.367  The judge determined that the conduct of 
employee Runion was neither threatening nor violent, and noted 
that the Atlantic Steel factors were inapposite because they apply 
in the workplace and not on a picket line.368  Thus, the ALJ in 
Cooper Tire ordered Runion reinstated with backpay.369  The 
?
362 362 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 2015 WL 3492100 (June 2, 2015). 
363 Id. at *2–3. 
364 Id. at *3–4 (noting word “crap” was not all that bad). 
365 Id. at *3–5. 
366 No. 08-CA-087155, 2015 WL 3544120 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 5, 2015), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA-087155. 
367 Id. at 8. 
368 Id. at 14–16. 
369 Id. at 20–21. 
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outcome in this case is particularly interesting when contrasted 
with the NLRB’s 2015 decision in Fresenius370 because there, the 
Board found that profane writing and drawings amounting to 
sexual harassment on a bulletin board in a breakroom was not 
protected in light of the employee’s dishonesty regarding the 
ensuing investigation.371  In Cooper Tire, employee Runion, like 
the Fresenius employee, denied his conduct, but here, the ALJ 
ordered Runion reinstated even after determining from the 
security video that Runion made the racially-charged statements 
at issue. 
The Cooper Tire decision is presently under appeal based 
upon exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, but in the meantime, it is 
important to note what the key differences are in these cases.372  
Cooper Tire involved only one instance of dishonesty, as opposed 
to the two acts of dishonesty in Fresenius, and in Cooper Tire, the 
conduct took place in the midst of a picket line, where heightened 
tempers are expected and where the standard for conduct is 
different from that in the workplace, as in Fresenius.373  In 
addition, the comments in Cooper involved stereotypical 
expectations regarding diet based upon race, whereas in 
Fresenius the scribbling was “vulgar, offensive, and . . . arguably 
threatening” to women employees who complained to 
management, thereby prompting the carefully tailored 
investigation.374 
B. Social Media Cases 
In Triple Play,375 employees who complained on Facebook 
about their boss’s inability to handle their payroll deductions for 
tax purposes and other managerial matters were deemed 
protected under the Act, even though the employee comments 
were profane.376  The most important lesson learned from Triple 
Play is that the Board will not apply the Atlantic Steel test to 
cases involving social media, in light of the fact that the place of 
?
370 Fresenius II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015). 
371 Id. at *1. 
372 See Cooper Tire, slip op. at 5. 
373 See id. at 3–5; see generally Fresenius II, 2015 WL 3932160. 
374 Cooper Tire, slip op. at 3–5; Fresenius II, 2015 WL 3932160, at *1. 
375 Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705 (Aug. 22, 
2014). 
376 Id. at *7. 
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discussion in such cases is the Internet and not face-to-face in the 
workplace.377  Thus, the employees’ comments in Triple Play 
remained protected under the Jefferson Standard test because 
the statements were not so disloyal or defamatory as to lose 
protection, nor were they maliciously untrue.378  In addition, the 
employer’s social media policy was found to be overly restrictive 
of protected concerted activity, and its savings clause did not 
save the policy from illegality.379  Thus, the employees were 
entitled to reinstatement and backpay, and the Board required 
revisions to the company’s Internet/Blogging policy as well as the 
posting of a notice.380 
In Bettie Page Clothing,381 the Board ordered reinstatement 
and backpay to employees who were terminated for engaging in 
protected concerted activity on social media, and it required 
Bettie Page to revise its handbook confidentiality rule, which 
forbade employees from disclosing wages and compensation to 
each other or to third parties.382  The Board also ordered Bettie 
Page to physically post at all of its stores and to distribute 
electronically throughout the company a notice referencing the 
ULPs and its intention not to commit the same again.383 
In Pier Sixty,384 the profane social media posting that led to 
employee Perez’s termination was inextricably linked to 
protected concerted activity, including his clear support of the 
union prior to an imminent NLRB election.385  The key takeaway 
from the Board’s decision was that the posting was evaluated 
under the “totality of the circumstances” with specific reference 
to the following: the evidence of antiunion animus at the 
company; the employer’s tolerance and managerial use of 
profanity; its provocation of the employee and his impulsive 
response; its rules against discussion; and its disproportionate 
?
377 Id. at *4. 
378 Id. at *7. 
379 Id. at *1, *8–9. 
380 Id. at *10–11. 
381 Bettie Page Clothing II, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 2014 WL 5524147 (Oct. 31, 
2014). 
382 Id. at *1–2. 
383 Id. at *2. The Board noted that it relied upon Guardsmark, LLC, 344 
N.L.R.B. 809 (2005) and Laurus Technical Institute, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 2014 WL 
2705207 (June 13, 2014) for its order to post the notice regarding the handbook rule 
violation companywide. Bettie Page Clothing II, 2014 WL 5524147, at *1 n.2. 
384 Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
385 Id. at *1–3. 
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imposition of discipline on Perez.386  The three-member panel in 
Pier Sixty cited Triple Play for the proposition that the Atlantic 
Steel framework is generally inapplicable to social media cases, 
preferring to evaluate the total circumstances to determine the 
egregiousness of the comments—an approach that led the Board 
to deem Perez’s conduct protected, resulting in reinstatement, 
backpay, rule revision, and notice posting.387 
In Tinley Park,388 the ALJ found that the employer violated 
the NLRA by terminating banquet server Santiago for her 
violation of its personal conduct and work rules, and for 
violations of its standard operating procedure on cell phone 
usage.389  The conduct leading up to Santiago’s discharge involved 
employees taking pictures of each other as well as selfies with 
Santiago’s phone and posting the pictures with sarcastic 
comments on Santiago’s Facebook page, including one that 
referenced the “no phones at work” policy that the employees 
were in the process of violating.390  Santiago posted a picture of 
the employees congregated in a hallway, quipping, “That’s how 
we work at TPCC”; other comments referenced the amount of 
work employees were doing, or not, as the case may be.391  The 
pictures posted on Facebook and the comments depicting the 
company in an unfavorable light were cited as reasons for 
Santiago’s discharge.392  While the comments posted were not 
truly profane, they did poke fun at the company, and Santiago 
posted that she was “working like an [sic] slave.”393  In the 
company’s view, all of Santiago’s posts were derogatory, 
including the pictures that compromised public perception of the 
convention center and its hospitality.394  In Tinley Park, the ALJ 
focused on four unlawful work rules, finding that they chilled 
?
386 Id. at *3. 
387 Id. at *3, *5–6 (citing Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 
WL 4182705, at *4 (Aug. 22, 2014)). 
388 Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Ctr., No. 13-CA-141609, 2015 WL 3759559 
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 16, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-141609. 
389 Id. at 1–2. 
390 Id. at 3–4. 
391 Id. at 4. 
392 Id. at 4–5. 
393 Id. 
394 Id. 
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employees in exercising their § 7 rights.395  The takeaway from 
this decision is that an employer must be careful of overbroad 
rules that prohibit disloyalty or disparagement, discussion of 
wage and salary information, discourteous or disrespectful 
conduct, or disruptive conduct, and it must not discipline or 
discharge employees for violating such overbroad rules that 
interfere with protected concerted activities. 
C. Profanity on the Breakroom Wall and Dishonesty 
The Board’s 2015 Fresenius396 decision focused on employee 
Grosso’s dishonesty in the face of a properly run investigation 
into offensive, profane, and arguably threatening comments and 
drawings about which several female employees complained.397  
The employer discharged Grosso for his comments and his 
dishonesty and the Board upheld the discharge, noting that the 
employer met its Wright Line burden that it would have 
terminated Grosso for his dishonesty anyway even absent his 
support of the union.398  The employer had discharged two other 
employees solely for dishonesty in another investigation, and 
thus the discipline of Grosso was not more severe due to his 
exercise of § 7 rights.399  The critical takeaway from Fresenius is 
that an employee who lies in an investigation into workplace 
sexual harassment will be held accountable and will likely not be 
reinstated, as such conduct is not protected activity under the 
NLRA.  Similarly, an employer who conducts a legitimate inquiry 
into sexual harassment in the workplace is protected in doing so 
as long as it does not exceed the boundaries of the legitimate 
purpose of the investigation. 
D. Takeaway from NLRB Profanity Cases 
The takeaway from the top ten NLRB profanity cases is that 
employers need to be very careful when enacting policies that 
unduly restrict employee discussion of wages, hours, working 
conditions, matters of mutual aid or protection under § 7 of the 
?
395 Id. at 5, 10 (citing Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage Vill.-
Livonia), 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646–47 (2004); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 
825 (1998)). 
396 Fresenius II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015). 
397 Id. at *1–2. 
398 Id. at *3 (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980)). 
399 See id. 
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Act, and when disciplining employees for violating such rules.  
The NLRB deems discipline and discharge of employees for 
violations of unduly restrictive employer rules illegal unless an 
employer establishes special circumstances relating to its 
business that justify restriction of § 7 rights, or unless the 
employer can prove that there is a separate basis that would 
have caused the employer to mete out the same discipline 
anyway.  The differences between face-to-face and virtual 
communication on email and social media primarily relate to the 
place of the discussion. 
The NLRB’s current approach on face-to-face workplace 
profanity cases is to apply the test from Atlantic Steel.400  The 
four factors from Atlantic Steel are: “(1) the place of the 
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature 
of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in 
any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.”401  In 
social media profanity cases, the Board currently uses a totality 
of the circumstances test that invokes some of the factors from 
Atlantic Steel, but not the first factor—the place of discussion—
because the discussion does not occur in the workplace.402  Under 
the totality test, the Board considers all relevant factors that 
reflect both the business interests of the employer in light of the 
far-reaching virtual context and factors impacting the employee 
and the exercise of § 7 rights.403  The employer is entitled to prove 
special circumstances that require it to restrict activities that 
interfere with its legitimate business interests; such interests 
may allow for restrictions on employee use of profanity, 
particularly in a retail context.404 
The employer’s own use of profanity, the professed moral 
values of those running the business, and the image of the 
company projected through its actions and advertising may all be 
considered when weighing the legality of employer rules that 
?
400 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979). 
401 Id. at 816. 
402 The Board first noted this in Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 
31, 2014 WL 4182705, at *4 (Aug. 22, 2014), and reiterated the point in its decision 
in Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *3 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
403 Pier Sixty II, 2015 WL 1457688, at *3. 
404 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945); see also 
supra notes 148–56 and accompanying text (discussing Member Miscimarra’s 
concurrence in the Starbucks case regarding recommended limits of protection on 
employee concerted activity in retail settings). 
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restrict employee communication, including profanity.405  
Managers who use profanity themselves or allow its use by other 
employees may not single out an employee who is engaged in 
protected concerted activity and discipline him or her for use of 
profanity.406  That kind of managerial action constitutes unequal 
treatment based upon the exercise of § 7 rights and is thus an 
ULP. 
The factors that the Board considers under the totality of the 
circumstances test include the following: employer wrongdoing, 
including evidence of antiunion animus; provocation of the 
employee by the employer; disproportionate punishment for those 
engaging in protected concerted activities; and any history of 
employer ULPs.407  The totality of the circumstances test also 
weighs: the time of the employee posting, that is, whether on 
non-work time, break time, or work time; the impact of the 
employee’s posting on the employer’s legitimate business 
interests; and whether, under the Wright Line test, the employer 
has shown that the employee would have been disciplined or 
discharged anyway, even without engaging in protected 
concerted activity.408  The Board has also looked to what 
employer rules relating to profanity have routinely proved 
problematic under the Act.  The resulting decisions outline an 
expectation that employer rules relating to employee profanity 
must be carefully drawn to allow employees to exercise § 7 rights, 
and the rules should provide specific examples of prohibited 
conduct to avoid ambiguity that leads employees to fear 
exercising their statutory rights.409  Rules that reasonably tend to 
chill employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights or those that 
explicitly restrict activities protected by § 7 are unlawful absent a 
showing of special circumstances.410 
?
405 Pier Sixty II, 2015 WL 1457688, at *3. 
406 Id. at *4. 
407 Id. at *3. 
408 See generally Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980). 
409 See generally Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel, 
NLRB, to All Reg’l Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers regarding 
the Report of the Gen. Counsel Concerning Employer Rules, GC 15-04 (Mar. 18, 
2015) (detailing recent employer rule cases with examples of lawful and unlawful 
rules on confidentiality, courtesy, employee conduct and communications, social 
media policies, cell phone use, and profanity). 
410 See Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705, at 
*8 nn.22–23 (first citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998); then 
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CONCLUSION 
The ten NLRB cases involving profanity illustrate the limits 
that the NLRA presently places upon managers with respect to 
discipline of employees who engage in conduct that is protected 
by § 7 of the Act.  Employee conduct may be vulgar, profane, and 
offensive and yet remain protected, or it may not be protected if 
the conduct is so egregious, dishonest, threatening, violent or 
insubordinate that it exceeds the Act’s protection.411  Employer 
rules relating to employee communication must not unduly 
restrict employees’ exercise of their § 7 rights.  If they do, the 
NLRB will require the employer to revise the rules.  As Board 
Member Johnson’s term recently ended,412 the changing 
composition of the NLRB may result in even more protection for 
employee profanity in the future, as Johnson has been more 
inclined than most Board members to find that offensive, profane 
language loses the protection of the Act.413 
?
citing Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage Vill.-Livonia), 343 
N.L.R.B. 646, 646 (2004)). 
411 See Richmond Dist. Neighborhood Ctr., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 2014 WL 
5465462, at *3 (Oct. 28, 2014) (finding Facebook exchange of student employees at 
teen center was insubordinate misconduct and not protected by the Act). 
412 See Harry I. Johnson, III, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/board/harry-i-johnson-iii (last visited May 19, 2016). Member Johnson’s term 
ended August 27, 2015. Id. 
413 See Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *5 (Mar. 31, 
2015) (Member Johnson, dissenting in part); Plaza Auto III, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 
2014 WL 2213747, at *19 (May 28, 2014) (Member Johnson, dissenting); Fresenius 
II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *1 n.2 (June 24, 2015) (noting that 
Member Johnson would not find that the handwritten statements of the 
complainant were protected). Cf. Starbucks IV, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 
2736112, at *10 (June 16, 2014) (Member Miscimarra, concurring) (noting that he 
would find that a retail employee such as Agins, who causes disruption or 
interference with the business, even when off duty, loses the protection of the Act). 
